


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# EUROPE TO-DAY

BY

DR. KARL POLANYI

with preface by

G. D. H. COLE, M.A.

Dr. Karl Polanyi, late Member of the Budapest Bar, Joint-Editor of "Der Österreichische Volkswirt" and Lecturer in Politics and Economics at the People's College, Vienna.

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*The Workers' Educational Trade Union Committee,*  
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## FOREWORD

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## PREFACE

I HAVE been asked to write a few words by way of introduction to Dr. Polanyi's book. I do so with pleasure, both as a friend and because, having read it, I feel able to commend it with a thoroughly clear conscience. Dr. Polanyi, out of his abounding knowledge, has been able to pack a quite remarkable amount of useful information into these few pages. Nor is his book a mere gathering of facts: on the contrary, it is especially to be praised for the skill shown in selecting only the significant—only what the plain man must know about if the day-to-day manoeuvres of European diplomacy and the foreign news regularly served up to him by the press, are to convey any real meaning to his mind. Without some such guidance as this little book sets out to provide, he is in danger of getting utterly lost amid the bewildering sequence of events. With Dr. Polanyi to help him, he can hope to make sure of the major happenings, though not, of course, to follow every minor intricacy of current European politics.

Above all else, this book makes plain the fundamental character of the present European conflict. Up to a few years ago, amid the bickerings of the great states of Western Europe, it was impossible for a reasonable man to take sides. He might favour collective security, and wish to strengthen the League of Nations as a defence of peace against aggression. But if he supported the friends of collective security and the League system, he found himself also defending the Treaty of Versailles and siding with the opponents of treaty revision—even where revision was obviously called for on grounds of simple justice. If, on the other hand, he plumped for revision, he found himself ranged on the side of Fascist Italy and of the League's principal enemies within the gates. And if, calling down a plague on both houses

in Western Europe, he set his hope and faith upon the Soviet Union, he found that he was expected to look forward hopefully, not to world peace, but to world revolution and to a devastating world war that would sweep capitalism (and how much else?) away.

By now, however, as Dr. Polanyi points out, the situation has become very much simpler—and also much more directly menacing. The issues arising out of the Versailles Treaty have not indeed wholly disappeared. But the Treaty has disintegrated—all except its territorial clauses. The League has disintegrated too, in face of its lamentable failure to check either Japanese or Italian aggression, or to make any mark at all on the movement of recent events. In the Spanish crisis, who thinks of the League as a possible source of help? It is plainly impotent: it hardly exists at all, save as a statistical office and a useful instrument for dealing with international issues of such a sort that they can be handled without raising the vital issues of war and peace.

This dramatic change in the entire world situation is due to the rise of Fascism—or rather to the victory, over a large part of Europe, of the forces for which Fascism stands. Fascism, acutely nationalist as each separate section of it is, counts fundamentally as an international force. It is, and it represents, the international counter-revolution, directed not merely against "Bolshevism", as on occasions its spokesmen try to make us believe, but against the whole movement and aspiration of democracy. It became plain in post-war Europe that the logical outcome of political democracy, of parliamentarianism, was economic democracy as well—the triumph of some sort of Socialism. Against this the old order of class-privilege was powerless to fight with the old weapons, save in a few countries where the economic foundations of capitalism were too strongly laid to have been seriously shaken even by the Great War. The old order had either to accept defeat, with the certainty of Socialism to follow, or to find new weapons



against democracy—weapons which the potential supporters of democracy could be induced to turn against the democrats themselves.

Nationalistic, war-mongering Fascism, pressed home with every art known to modern psychology and propagandist technique, and paid for lavishly by the die-hards of the old order, supplied the answer. For Europe was full to overflowing of sufferings and legitimate grievances, other than the basic economic grievance, which could be exploited by demagogues at the expense of democracy. This was the easier, because the countries which should have defended democracy, not merely at home, but by their international policy as well, were terribly false to their trust. Instead of building up the League of Nations into an instrument of international justice, they used it to uphold the injustices of the peace settlement. Instead of implementing their own promises to disarm down to the level of the armaments which they had imposed on the defeated countries, they persisted in keeping their armaments, and thus foisting a permanent stigma of inferiority upon their late enemies. France, driven on by fear of a German revenge, was in this respect the worst offender. But British policy was hideously weak and vacillating and, as far as it had any clear direction, still aimed far more at the balance of power than at the needed Concert of Europe. And the Soviet Union, instead of aiming, as it has done since the Fascist victories opened its eyes, at uniting all the forces which there was hope of mustering on the democratic side, waged war most intensively on those who were nearest to it in opinion, and must share with the most timorous and compromising of the leaders of Social Democracy the responsibility for that fateful split in the working-class movement which allowed Fascism to climb almost unresisted to power.

To-day, it is easy enough to see past mistakes. But it is much less easy to undo their consequences. To-day, the Soviet Union is working for democratic

unity over the widest possible front. But past errors make unity terribly difficult to achieve—all the harder, because of the internal convulsions through which the Soviet Union itself is passing under the damaging influence of fear. In France, the People's Front was not achieved until Fascism was at the very threshold of victory. Internationally, the union of the forces of democracy will perhaps come only under the stimulus of a necessity so dire and immediate that no democrat can possibly mistake it any longer.

For those who have wits to grasp the underlying trend of events, the need is already plain enough. Spain provides the outstanding lesson. We know now, beyond a peradventure, the technique of the counter-revolutionary forces. It was once said that Fascism was not an article of export; but no statement could be more untrue. For the present, Fascism does not make world war: it stirs up civil wars in order to strengthen its hand for the future world war for which it is constantly preparing. General Franco would have been crushed long ago but for the help poured in to his rebel forces by the Fascist Powers. In all probability, there would have been no Spanish rising but for the promise of that help. And, whoever wins in Spain, it will not be long before the Fascist States are fomenting civil war in some other country—Czechoslovakia, maybe, or even France—in the hope of detaching yet another area from the potential forces of democracy, and establishing over yet another nation the monstrous uncivilisation of the Totalitarian State. And maybe, yet again, the supposedly democratic countries will stand by foolishly, alternately flapping and wringing their hands, instead of joining together in time in an effective league of pooled security for resistance to the ever increasing menace of Fascist dictatorship.

But there! It is not my business to write Dr. Polanyi's book for him, or to restate the essentials which he has stated so well himself, and set so clearly in the right relation to Europe's post-war history. My task is merely,

as a veteran adherent and tutor of the W.E.A. and the W.E.T.U.C., to commend what I believe to be just the book that is wanted to give working-class students a first brief but comprehensive view of present-day European realities. Inevitably, I do not agree with all Dr. Polanyi's judgments; and if I had been writing his book there would have been differences of stress, and even of opinion. But these differences do not affect his essential point—the urgent need for democratic unity and the building of an international democratic front pledged to a collective system of mutual defence against war-mongering and aggressiveness, and therewith to the replacement of power-politics by a policy of international democratic justice. If this front is to be built, Great Britain must help to build it; and my hope is that Dr. Polanyi's book will help towards creating in Great Britain the force of democratic opinion which will compel our Government to come down on the side of decency and civilisation against the man-eating tigers which are at present loose in the world.

G. D. H. COLE.

Hendon, July 1937.

## INTRODUCTION

IT CAN be safely asserted that a person who had learnt his geography and history as recently as twenty years ago would be more often than not at a loss to comprehend the Continental events recorded in our daily papers. He would miss some important states on the map and be confronted by a series of new ones; he would be handicapped by the fact that in the majority of the old countries the social, political and economic system had changed beyond recognition; and eventually, he would come to realise that he is living in a world that is in imminent danger of self-destruction on account of conflicting ideas and unsolved problems, the very names of which he had never heard before.

Yet this new and swiftly changing Continent is disquietingly near to England's shores. Bombers, if not obstructed, could reach them in almost as many minutes as it would have taken hours for an invader twenty years ago. The havoc wrought by the onslaught of the enemy would be perhaps a hundred or even a thousand times greater. But quite apart from the dangers of an invasion, the interests of the average man in this country may be at any time affected by events abroad. His earnings and income, working conditions, even his civic rights and liberties may be imperilled overnight by what may seem to him a thunderbolt from the blue. No wonder that the industrial and political life in this country reacts to a marked degree to every major change in the tense atmosphere of the Continent.

This little book sets out as a guide to this new Europe. What are the *live issues* on which her people are so deeply divided that a general conflagration seems sometimes almost inevitable? And what are the *main facts* that we must keep in mind if we wish to understand these issues more adequately? We will try to supply an

answer, as adequately as possible in the limited space at our disposal.

An introductory hint on national, religious and social causes of war should make it easier to disentangle the knotted strands of post-War politics.

On no point does present-day Europe differ more widely from that of our grandfathers' time than as to the conflicts which may lead to war. In recent centuries *national* conflicts predominated in world affairs. At an earlier stage *religious* dissensions were a common cause of armed conflict. The Crusades, for example, lasted for several centuries and the wars of Islam continued to disturb the peace of Medieval Europe for some eight or nine hundred years. In modern times, the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), which reduced a once prosperous Germany to a desert, was mainly a struggle between Protestant and Catholic, while the English Civil War of the same century was heated by the fires of Puritan and Papist fervour.

Now, at a time of religious strife it is quite common that in a clash between different states the people of one country should take part in the civil wars of the other country on the side of their co-religionists. Of this the Thirty Years' War was a striking example. In the course of the Civil War raging between Protestant and Catholic Germany, Protestant Sweden and Catholic Austria supported their German co-religionists respectively. Other states tried to make use of German religious dissensions without any regard to their religious preferences. Thus Catholic France offered her help to the German Protestant princes in order to advance her own national interests.

Obviously, something closely akin to this is happening in Spain to-day—except that in our time civil wars tend not so much to be of a religious but rather of a *social* character. However, there is more similarity between religious and social wars than meets the eye. The English Civil War, for example, was not only a religious but also a social war between the feudal aristocracy and the rising

middle classes, while the American Civil War, to mention another instance, was a social war with a distinct religious strain due to northern Puritanism. Thus the emergence of *social* alongside of *national conflict* in our time goes a long way to explain what is, perhaps, the most striking feature of contemporary history, namely the frequency with which *foreign wars* and *civil wars* intersect in the pattern of international events.

But the distinction between national and social causes of conflict is also most helpful in another way for the understanding of post-War Europe. In the first period of post-War history (1919-1933) national conflict occupies the scene, in the second period (after 1933) social conflict is added unto it. The *national* alignment can be traced back to the Great War and the Treaties. Almost invariably it centres around the questions of Revision and Collective Security. The *social* alignment has sprung into international prominence since the establishment of Nazi Germany; essentially it is a conflict between Fascism and Democracy. These two factors, separately and conjointly, account for almost the whole of recent political developments in Europe.

## PART I

# THE VERSAILLES SYSTEM AND ITS FAILURE (1919-1933)

## CHAPTER I

### TREATY REVISION AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

THE NATIONAL alignments in which the states of Europe confronted one another were, up to recently, fairly well defined: on the one hand *France* and her Eastern allies, —Poland and the three states of the Little Entente, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania; on the other, *Germany* and the smaller defeated states like Hungary and Bulgaria, supported diplomatically by two great powers, Italy and Russia. The first group formed the anti-revisionist *bloc*; the other contained, roughly, the revisionist states.

The French group was clear cut; its members were held together by the bonds of a closely knit alliance in the framework of Geneva. The German group was less compact; there were no alliances; it relied for its coherence more on common interest and diplomatic co-operation than on formal agreement.

This alignment does not exist any more. The national fronts of the first post-War period have lost their original solidity. It is doubtful, for instance, whether some of the states of the Little Entente or Poland still follow unconditionally the French line; Soviet-Russia, on the other hand, dropped out of the revisionist camp altogether.

#### **The Versailles System**

Revisionism and anti-revisionism have, of course, their origin in the Versailles Treaty, to which for the sake of

precision the Treaties of St. Germain, Trianon, Neuilly and Sèvres must be added. Except for the last, which concerned Turkey, the territorial provisions of the Peace Treaties have remained unimpaired, and the boundaries of Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria are still as they were set out in the Treaties of 1919. Revision claims refer to-day to frontiers only.

In almost all other respects the Peace Treaties have ceased to be effective. Reparations have gone; the defeated countries have ceased to be disarmed. Germany has reoccupied the Rhineland and is erecting fortifications in that region; she has regained full control of the Reich Bank and the Reich Railways; she has reasserted her sovereignty over the internationalised rivers and the Kiel Canal. The Versailles system as a general order of things has come to an end.

The first period of post-War history was marked by ceaseless attempts at making it work. These efforts were bound to fail. But it would be mistaken to accept at its face value the revisionist claim that the weakness of Versailles lay mainly in the alleged injustices contained in the Treaties. Some measure of injustice had been undoubtedly committed, as by the manner in which the new frontiers of Hungary were drawn. But the root of the trouble lay deeper. The order of things established in Versailles could not last. In fact, there was but the semblance of an order. With the one-sided disarmament of the defeated states the traditional order under which every nation as an independent sovereign power was expected to stand up for itself had been set aside, but no effective rule of law had been established instead. The League of Nations which was supposed to ensure such a rule could not exert actual executive power, as we shall see later on. When general disarmament proved impossible of achievement, the failure of the Versailles system became apparent. Accordingly, the breakdown of the Disarmament Conference was followed by the liquidation of the Versailles basis and a reversion to the old power system in its most vicious form.



In fact, the Versailles system was the outcome of a peculiar set of circumstances. After Germany's defeat in the field, France wanted above all to provide against any attempt of Germany at drawing even with France in a new war of so-called *revanche*. Her statesmen insisted on either dismembering Germany by setting up a Catholic German state South of the river Main, or on making her otherwise incapable of a war of aggression on France. President Wilson and Lloyd George had to pledge themselves to offer a treaty of alliance to France in order to induce her to agree to the milder terms that we actually find in the Treaties to-day. Eventually, the U.S.A. repudiated the signature of her President by refusing to ratify the Treaty of Versailles; America's promise to France became void. Whereupon Britain, too, regarded herself as released from her obligations under the tripartite agreement with France and America. Thus it came to pass that there was no military alliance of the traditional type in being that could have safeguarded the permanency of the new condition of affairs.

### **Equality of Status and the League**

The only alternative to an old style military alliance was the setting up of a League of Nations that would safeguard the rule of law by the strong arm of an international executive. On President Wilson's proposal an approximation to such a League had actually been created in Versailles, and the defeated powers, one by one, became its members. But the one-sided disarmament of the defeated powers proved a fateful obstacle. Only a League in which all nations had an equal standing could be above the suspicion of being merely a caucus of victorious powers organising under the cover of noble principles to keep the defeated in subservience. And unless the League commanded the confidence and the spontaneous loyalty of its members, it could not hope to exert an effective international authority such as would restrain an aggressor by the show of overwhelming force. Equality of rights of all member states was

essential to the existence and functioning of the League.

But Germany, Hungary, Austria and Bulgaria had been not only disarmed, but their future armaments had been restricted in the Treaties to a minimum hardly sufficient to safeguard the maintenance of internal order. No time limit had been set to the disarmament provisions; in fact this order of things was supposed to last for ever. Whatever we may think of the *moral* standing of a people who are disarmed under international law, their *political* and *legal* standing is necessarily lower than that of countries which have a right to be armed. As members of an international association of peoples the defeated states were handicapped in all their dealings, their lesser rights putting them into a position of all-round inferiority. A genuine League could not be built on discrimination. The disarmed condition of some countries, while others remained armed, was a fateful source of weakness to the League.

True, some measure of discrimination appeared to be inevitable. The great powers, and, by courtesy, Belgium, were declared permanent members of the Council of the League, while other states had to await their term to be allowed to serve on the Council. But such discrimination was not necessarily out of keeping with the functioning of a genuine League. Small states carry naturally less weight than great and powerful states, their responsibilities also being correspondingly smaller. This does not imply that the bossing of the small states by the great powers is a sound condition of affairs which is conducive to genuine peace. Small countries have a right to self-determination as much as their bigger fellows, and if discrimination in favour of the great powers were to transgress these limits the League would lose all unity and coherence. But it does imply that there is nothing inherently wrong in the permanent council membership of the great powers, for their larger influence is in a very real sense counterweighed by their heavier responsibilities. Their interests are affected wherever there

is a disturbance; and it is to them that the task will fall of keeping peace and order, wherever these may be endangered. That they usually manage to make the best of this situation to further their own particular ends, does not impair the truth of this statement. The discrimination between great and small powers is due to history and geography, not to the framers of the Covenant.

We have stressed this point so as to avoid a common way of obscuring the issue. Quite often Germany's insistent demand for equality of status drew the comment that other members of the League also lacked equality of status and that it was therefore inaccurate to say that there was discrimination against Germany. This argument, frequently adduced with the best of intentions, was out of place. In spite of the prerogative of permanent council membership awarded to the great powers, membership in the League was based on equality. Only the defeated countries were, by implication, refused an equal status.

### **The Vicious Circle**

The same difficulty asserted itself in yet another form. Although, in the retrospect, the chief anomaly about the defeated countries was their disarmed condition in an armed world, their complaints naturally referred first of all to the territorial and other losses which they had sustained under the Treaties. Their primary demand was not for arms but for revision of the Treaties which were denounced as unjust, unreasonable and absurd. We will look later on into the rights and wrongs of this assertion. Suffice here to say, that some measure of revision was undoubtedly possible without causing new injustice to others, and that, by such an alteration of the Treaties the general situation would have become appreciably easier. But revision would have naturally increased the economic and other resources of the defeated countries, thus improving their chances of preparing, if secretly, for the day when they could once more challenge the

former victors on the field of battle. In absence of any military safeguard to the new order, the victorious countries refused to agree to such a step unless their own security was ensured. They proposed the strengthening of the system of collective security foreshadowed in the Covenant of the League, and the setting up of an international executive in Geneva which would bring to bear effective sanctions upon an aggressor. Thus, while the defeated countries clamoured for revision, the victorious countries of the continent raised the countercry of collective security. They asked for assurances that all members of the League should commit themselves in advance to offer mutual assistance against an aggressor. But neither the defeated countries nor some of the more far-sighted of the victorious ones were inclined to shoulder such commitments under the given circumstances. The defeated countries justly insisted that security without revision simply meant security for a state of affairs which they themselves were straining every nerve to upset. And the more far-sighted among the victorious countries, first of all Britain herself, pointed out with good reason that they did not wish to guarantee some of the Treaty frontiers, the justice and practicability of which they doubted. Here again, a deadlock was reached. The one group of countries demanded that revision should precede collective security; the other insisted on the opposite order. Only the simultaneous performance of both transactions—taking with one hand and giving with the other—could have brought a solution. Europe could, perhaps, have avoided the present deadlock, had revision and collective security been tackled at the same time.

But no serious attempt to this effect was ever made. For this the French and British must share the blame, if there is blame at all. To the Englishman it appeared most appropriate to think of the defeated countries in terms of sportsmanship. The problem of revision called obviously for a generous treatment. "Don't hit a fellow when he is down," is a principle that appeals to every

Englishman. The approach to the German or Hungarian case offered no serious difficulty to him. It was with the French that he was inclined to become irritated. Why this craze for security? After all it was the Germans and not the French who had been disarmed, and yet the French appeared to be so completely hypnotised by fear that they were deaf to the voice of justice and reason. Certainly there was something wrong with them.

Yet a simple analogy will help us to present the realities of the situation.

The German and the French neighbour had had a tough fight. The Frenchman got the better of it and put the German thoroughly and, as he thought, permanently in his place. He made him pay up to the full and removed every scrap of arms from the premises for fear that the German should take his revenge. Time passed and tempers cooled down. The Frenchman's friends, who stood by him in his fight, urged reconciliation. Some concessions were made to the German, who continued, however, to feel at the mercy of his armed neighbour as long as he had only his naked hands to defend himself with. The Frenchman was now prepared to consider the revision of the conditions of the treaty with the German neighbour and allow him to possess a hatchet or even a gun if only his own friends would pledge themselves to come to his assistance if the German tried to use these weapons against him. In short, unless the other states of Europe committed themselves to collective security the French would stand pat on their Treaty rights. After all, they had suffered too often from German invasion, they said, to risk another one, if they could help it.

The demand for revision and the demand for collective security were interlinked. As long as one half of Europe continued to clamour for the one and the other half for the other, each side insisting on the precedence of its demand, no progress was possible. Great Britain perceived the need for some degree of revision but was loth to commit herself to any system of collective security. The French produced a series of plans for collective

security, mutual assistance, setting up of an international police force or even of a League Army, but made practically no concessions to the defeated enemy unless forced to do so, and then with a lack of good grace that ruined the psychological effect.

## TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

OF THE four defeated powers, i.e. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, only Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria must be considered as actively revisionist in this period. Although both Austria and Turkey belonged to the revisionist group of states, their foreign policy was not dominated by this concern, as they had no territorial claims which they wished to press. Like Russia and Italy, they were diplomatic supporters of the revisionists proper rather than revisionists themselves. For frontiers are the real issues at stake between national states. They are the skeleton in the cupboard. The demands which are being openly pressed usually concern financial or economic questions, the rights of racial minorities or, more often, merely the participation of the countries concerned in some scheme of a general nature, like international economic reconstruction or regional trade agreements. But such schemes almost invariably affect in some manner or other the general policy of a country, often to the point of infringing upon its independence by restricting its freedom of action in favour of one group of states as against another. In the background looms the territorial problem. For any concessions made to the demands which are under discussion must necessarily affect the prospects of the country in the future to decide the ultimate political issue, the territorial claims, in its favour. The term political tends to take on the meaning of territorial, for not the questions immediately at issue determine the political alignments of the states, but the questions which, in the long run, must inevitably divide them; in our present world these are, far above all others, the territorial questions. It has proved easier to convince a







group of the most powerful states of the earth of the need to relinquish their claim to hundreds of millions of pounds due to them under the title of reparations, than to compel one of the small neighbours of Germany, Belgium, to reconsider the plebiscite in the frontier district of Eupen and Malmédy. It was easier to adjust, for a time at least, Poland's and Germany's vastly diverging interests on racial minorities and the use of the Corridor, as long as the territorial status was maintained, than to solve the problem of the partition of the Teschen District that has continued to divide Czechoslovakia and Poland ever since the War. Thus, in passing review on the main revision issues, we must fix our attention primarily on the territorial aspect of the treaties.

### Old and New Austria

Let us start with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This empire consisted of two separate states linked by the throne of the Hapsburgs. The unity of the Dual Monarchy was upheld, apart from the dynasty, by a common army, a common diplomatic service and a financial administration concerning these two. When the armies of the Dual Monarchy were disbanded on the battle-fields after an amazing display of staying power and a dogged resistance to doom, the empire broke up. Both Austria and Hungary dissolved into their component parts according to the racial extraction of these parts.

Old Austria contained, apart from the Germans, an important Polish, Czech, Slovenian and Italian population. In 1919, the Polish province of Galicia joined the newly created state of Poland, which was formed out of the Polish territories of Russia, Germany and Austria, the three states between which historical Poland had been finally partitioned in 1795. The Czech parts of old Austria, Bohemia and Moravia, became the nucleus of the present Czechoslovakia, which includes also the Slovak and Ruthenian regions of former Hungary. The Slovenes were incorporated in the new Yugoslav empire, formed out of the former Serbia, which includes to-day

also important territories of former Hungary, such as Croatia, the Bácska and Bánát as well as Bosnia. (This latter province had stood under the joint administration of Austria and Hungary). The Italians of Istria and of the Southern Tyrol were handed over to Italy together with a substantial German minority. Apart from the Southern Tyrol and Bohemia, none of the lost regions contained a substantial German population. The German territory proper, Vienna and the Alpine region, was formed into a separate, independent state under the name of Austria. It is now easy to see why this small Austria did not strive to regain her old frontiers. She was the German rump of a non-German empire that had been held together in the past not by national bonds but by the chances of history and the patrimonial interests of a dynasty. When in 1918 the armies of the empire were defeated and the dynasty forfeited its throne, old Austria almost spontaneously dissolved into her racial constituents. The new Austria was born as a Republic. The idea of *revanche* was entirely alien to her. Her foreign policy never as much as envisaged the possibility of regaining her "lost frontiers." She regarded herself as a new country without any connexion whatever with the former members of the dynastic patrimony of the Hapsburgs. Thus, Austria, the greatest loser of all, never became a revisionist state.

### Rump-Hungary

Precisely the opposite was the effect of the Treaty on the new Hungary. One of the best English authorities on that country rightly says that "The demand for Treaty revision entirely dominates Hungary's foreign policy." Hungary had existed for more than a thousand years as a country ruled by the Magyars by the right of conquest. In 1526 the great plains fell to the Turk. The remainder linked its fate in 1686 with the Hapsburgs, the late emperors of Austria. A few years afterwards the Turk was finally driven from the country.

The greater part of the population of old Hungary was of non-Magyar origin, some of them speaking Slavonic

idioms like the Slovak in the North, the Serbo-Croatian in the South West, or the Ruthenian in the North East. The South-East of Hungary was inhabited mainly by Rumanians. Almost all over this territory the towns were settled by Hungarians, both Magyars and Jews. Moreover, a very substantial enclave of Magyars persisted in the south eastern corner of the country. German colonists had settled both in the heart of the country, near the capital, Budapest, and in the north and south west under their ancient charters; many towns also contained more than a fair sprinkling of them. Jews had contributed greatly to the rise of urban civilisation; in the backward Ruthenian mountain regions of the north east, however, they continued to exist on a low cultural level as a drag on the countryside.

But this medley of races in Hungarian territory had not been brought under one rule as a result of dynastic marriages and international deals as in the case of Austria. Magyar leadership rested on the superior political ability of a warlike race holding the central region of an important geographic and economic unit. With the monopoly of power went the monopoly of education and culture—both mainly aimed at the development of those qualities in the race on which the perpetuation of leadership and rule depended. The loss of the non-Magyar parts of Hungary amounted to an almost complete dispossession of the Magyars whose main function had been to provide the lost regions with an administration, a commercial and transport system directed from Budapest, and a financial mechanism capable of distributing the foreign capital needed to exploit the riches of the country. When Hungary's defeat in the field opened to the racial minorities of Hungary the road to national independence, the territories detached from the Magyar centre of the country contained a very appreciable percentage of Magyars, and the now almost purely Magyar population of the remaining rump refused to accept the loss as final. The restoration of the integrity of historical Hungary became

the backbone of national politics. After a nine months' interval almost equally divided between a democratic and a Communist revolution, the feudal nobility regained political control of the country in 1919. Magyar nobility had been the sole beneficiary of all political and administrative advantages, and, jointly with the Jews, also of the financial and economic monopolies of Greater Hungary. Short of a complete change in standards of life and outlook, no permanent acceptance of the new situation was possible to them. Under their political lead Hungary became the stronghold of revisionism on the Danube.

Hungary's demand for revision was based on three sets of facts. The first concerned the breaking-up of historical Hungary into her racial constituents. The second referred to the injustices committed in the course of the drawing-up of the new frontiers. The third was based on the treatment of Magyar minorities by their new masters in the regions that formerly belonged to Hungary. The latter complaint is not without foundation in so far as it refers to Rumania and Jugoslavia. The Transylvanian Magyars, for instance, were, for a time, comparatively even worse off under Rumanian rule than the Rumanians had been under Magyar rule. We shall return to this question later on when dealing with some broader aspects of the vexed question of the protection of national minorities.

What we wish to point out here is the ambiguity of the phrase "revision of frontiers" when used with reference to the first two complaints. Along most of the present Hungarian border-line a Magyar population has been left just outside the frontier, a population that could have been allowed to stay within present Hungary without forcing also an appreciable number of non-Magyars to stay under Magyar rule. The number of Magyars thus left just outside the border may amount to a bare million. The political atmosphere would have been decidedly, and perhaps decisively, improved, if such a rectification of frontiers had been conceded, as would

have brought these artificially segregated batches back to the Mother country. But rectification of frontiers and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Hungary are two entirely different propositions. From the national point of view, the present frontiers are unjustly drawn, but the former ones were even more unjust (from the same point of view). On the other hand, while the restoration of the old frontiers might remedy the economic insufficiency of rump-Hungary, and incidentally, bring back all Magyars under Magyar rule, the mere rectification of the frontier will achieve neither. Admittedly, such a rectification would not diminish the economic difficulties of the new Hungary, while still leaving millions of Magyars under foreign rule.

It is quite a common mistake to believe, that the *integrity* demand is actually in the nature of a bargaining counter, with which to secure the more modest demand of frontier *rectification*. Such a view is entirely erroneous. The two demands do not merge into one another. Rectification of the frontiers would leave rump-Hungary geographically very much as it is to-day; the restoration of Hungarian integrity would change the form and extension of rump-Hungary beyond recognition and, incidentally, destroy three of the existing Danubian states. Indeed, it may be a question of life or death for Hungary's neighbours, which of the two meanings of the term revision—rectification or integrity—will be dominant in Hungary's foreign policy.

### New Turkey

The Turkish Empire, which was dismembered in the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), disappeared from the map as did its Danubian parallel. Present-day Turkey is the result of the military victory won under Kemal Pasha Atatürk over the Greek army in 1921-22, to which Great Britain lent her diplomatic support. In the Treaty of Sèvres Turkey was deprived not only of her Arabian and Egyptian empire, but also of her European possessions of Constantinople and Thracia, as well as the Aegean coast.

The Turks reversed this decision on the battlefield. In the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) they regained their ancient capital of Constantinople as well as the Mediterranean coast, including Smyrna. Turkey has remained a European power. But neither in Europe nor in Asia does she raise territorial demands. Modern Turkey is "intensely nationalist and yet in her nationalism no menace to any other state."

### **Bulgaria**

She has been described as the Hungary of the Balkans. This small state, situated on the Black Sea, between Rumania and Turkey, fought three national wars within the short period of six years. In the first she gained a brilliant victory. Together with her Serbian and Greek allies she drove, in 1912, the Turk back to the walls of Constantinople. Almost at once she was robbed of the booty by her former allies, in conjunction with Rumania, who wished to get a share in the spoils, although she had not taken part in the war. Between themselves, they not only managed to deprive Bulgaria of most of her territorial acquisitions, but actually succeeded in crippling the country after a short but sanguinary war. During the Great War Bulgaria hoped to get her revenge. She joined the Central powers in their sweep into Serbian territory, in 1915. The disaster that overcame the Central powers on the Salonica front in August, 1918, bore down most heavily upon Bulgaria. Yugoslavia and Greece encroached on her territory to an even greater degree than before. Bulgaria lost her access to the Aegean. In spite of this, the popular peasant government of Stambuliisky took up with great moral courage a pacific and non-nationalist line, discouraging energetically the nationalist officers' group and the Macedonian intelligentsia who were pressing for a war of *revanche* against the Western neighbour. But the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation, the IMRO, with its headquarters in Bulgaria, forced a counter-revolution and Bulgaria started out on a revisionist foreign policy.

### Germany

The most powerful among the defeated is also the most powerful among the revisionist states. Her territorial claims can be usefully discussed according to the country against which the claim is directed.

### *France*

Alsace-Lorraine went to France. This province had been annexed by Germany after the Franco-German war of 1870-71. Its population is partly German in speech but predominantly French in sentiment. In 1925 Germany signed the Locarno Treaty in which she voluntarily relinquished all claims to Alsace-Lorraine. At the time, this was regarded as the final settlement of the question. In effect, the leaders of the Third Reich continue to insist that no territorial dispute is conceivable between Germany and France. It can be safely asserted that up to Hitler's coming, at least, Germany had completely acquiesced in the loss of Alsace-Lorraine.

### *Belgium*

The districts of Eupen and Malmédy went to Belgium. The Germans had just reason for criticism of the method of the plebiscite which had been arranged in this region and the result of which was unfavourable to them. Since 1925, however, the final acceptance of her Western frontiers by Germany was definitely understood to include Eupen and Malmédy.

### *Poland: Upper Silesia, Danzig and the Corridor*

Germany lost all her Polish territories to the newly established Polish state. The province of Posen, the greater part of Western Prussia, some parts of Upper Silesia, fell to Poland, unconditionally. In the important industrial district of Upper Silesia a plebiscite gave Germany a sixty per cent majority. Yet the territory was divided between Poland and Germany and Germany lost the greater part of the coal mines, all iron ore, and some eighty per cent of the heavy industries to Poland. The



Germans have never accepted the partition of Upper Silesia as lawful. However, the partition has impaired the economic value of this district substantially. As long as German-Polish relationships are tolerable, the Upper Silesian question can be expected to remain in abeyance.

The so-called Polish Corridor is a much more incisive problem. The Peace Treaty gave Poland access to the sea across former German territory, cutting off the German province of Eastern Prussia from the Mother country. Though, racially, the Corridor was more Polish than German, the setting up of the Corridor was looked upon as Germany's most vital grievance. Moreover, in absence of a seaport on the stretch of the coast belonging to the Polish Corridor, the old German town of Danzig was detached from Eastern Prussia and was made into a Free City under the Protectorate of the League. But the position of Poland became altogether a privileged one. In her foreign relationships Danzig was represented by Poland; the Free City became part of the Polish customs system, and so on. Subsequently, the Poles founded a seaport of their own, Gdynia, as a most effective rival to Danzig, on the Corridor coast of the Baltic. At present, League supervision in Danzig has become nominal, and local government has fallen under the sway of Germany.

The establishment of a Polish corridor across German territory is Germany's chief complaint against the Versailles Treaty. Agrarian distress in Eastern Prussia, it appears, is partly due to the existence of the Corridor, which amounts to a semi-dismemberment of that province. It is easily overlooked by Germans that the territory concerned has always been peopled mainly by Poles, that it has become purely Polish to-day, and that Poland's free access to the sea may be more worthy of consideration than the unimpeded traffic by land between Germany's Eastern province and the rest of the country. In fact, German railway traffic across the Corridor is working smoothly—no passports, nor customs visitations

—communications by sea are safe in peace as well as in war time, and the poverty of the countryside in backward Eastern Prussia is more readily accounted for by the monopoly of extensively cultivated large estates than to the alleged restrictions on traffic due to the Corridor.

Whenever the forces of German revision are called into play, the Corridor must hold pride of place. In her agreement with Poland of Feb. 1934, Germany has undertaken to shelve this issue for a period of ten years. Up to the present she has kept her word, in spite of a vast increase both in nationalist spirit and military strength. The shelving of the Corridor issue by an ultra-patriotic German Government for a comparatively long stretch of time proves conclusively that the keeping of the peace was not made impossible by the Versailles Treaty, as had been so often thoughtlessly asserted.

### *Lithuania*

The population of Memel, about 150,000, were supposed to be allowed to decide by a plebiscite whether they wished to belong to Germany or to Lithuania. A Lithuanian military coup, carried out in January, 1923, made the plebiscite impossible. The League Council accepted the *fait accompli* as it had tolerated the Polish military *coup* against the Lithuanian capital, Vilna, three years before. The Germans, who form the overwhelming majority in the town of Memel, were supposed to be safeguarded by a special statute against oppressive tendencies of the Lithuanian Government in Kaunas. Partly on account of the absolutist methods of the Lithuanian dictatorship, partly on account of the Nazi influence in Memel, the statute cannot be said to be working too well. The Memel question may be raised by Germany any day, as a demand for revision.

## THE DAY-TO-DAY ISSUES OF REVISIONISM

WHILE TERRITORIAL revision remained a background issue which never entered the sphere of actual negotiations, reparations, disarmament and racial minorities formed the chief subject of international discussions in the first post-War period.

**Reparations**

Undoubtedly, reparation claims had been fixed too high. Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria soon stopped paying them altogether, not however before serious damage was done to their economic position. But the wrangle about reparations continued to poison the international atmosphere. Their main burden now fell on Germany. Even when yearly payments had been reduced to manageable proportions, it proved difficult to make substantial payments from one country to another without deranging the economic system of the debtor and, even more, of the creditor country. The Dawes Plan (1924) tried to meet this difficulty by an elaborate system of transfer. But curiously enough, this time the ultimate amount of Germany's debt remained open. In 1929 the Young Plan fixed the total of reparations, lowered the amount of the yearly payments somewhat, and "commercialised" the mechanism of transfer almost completely by transforming the debt into negotiable bonds. However, by the summer of 1931 the economic depression began to affect the international credit system to such a degree that President Hoover called a general moratorium for all War debts, including reparations. It was too late. Central European banks had been for a long time at the breaking-point. The failure of the Bodencreditanstalt in Vienna in 1929 was the first

warning signal. This important bank had to be hastily taken over by the most powerful bank of the old Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the Creditanstalt in Vienna, the bank of the Rothschilds. In May, 1931, the Creditanstalt herself collapsed under the strain. The consequent withdrawal of foreign balances from German banks caused a panic, which, in spite of the Hoover moratorium, brought the Darmstädter-und Nationalbank to book. A general suspension of payments was announced in Germany. In the course of the ensuing crisis reparations were altogether abolished at the Lausanne Conference in the Summer of 1932. They have now disappeared from international politics.

Reparations were part of the Versailles system, and one of its most harmful parts, at that. Yet the German contention that reparations ruined Germany and, incidentally, caused the world economic depression, is a half-truth, at the best. In 1928, when the first full annuity was due under the Dawes plan, the German state had no public debt and had only a small army to provide for. The public debt had been wiped out by inflation, the army had been restricted by the Treaty. In comparison with England or France this meant an advantage of a saving of approximately £125,000,000, the sum that she was expected to pay in reparations that year. Moreover, the U.S.A. were pouring long-term loans into the country faster than German payments were due. On part of these loans as well as on the short-term credits advanced later on by British acceptance banks, Germany defaulted in 1931. Both the productive capacity of German industrial plant and the real wealth of German municipalities had been, by this time, substantially increased by the proceeds of Germany's foreign borrowing. In the purely economic sense, reparations hardly amounted to more than a rather troublesome nuisance, to both debtor and creditor. (The countries receiving reparations had to take them in gold or in goods, being in either case in danger of losing more by the damage done to their trade and credit system than they could stand to gain by

the financial advantages of these payments to their budgets.) The trouble with reparations was not so much economic as political. Germany regarded reparations as a tribute imposed upon the country by the victors. Governments that did not do their best to get rid of reparations, were denounced as unpatriotic by the nationalists. Because they did not want to pay reparations, Germans were inclined to imagine that all their ills derived from these enforced payments. In fact, nothing of the sort was the case. In 1928 Germany was as prosperous as England, and in many ways more so. The vast unemployment figures of which so much was made in the years 1930 to 1933 by the Nationalists and Nazis who were endeavouring to discredit the Republican Germany were no worse than those in other countries; in fact, they never reached the dimensions of the American depression. A Germany ruined by reparations is a myth.

### Disarmament

The defeated countries had a moral claim to the disarmament of the victorious countries. In fact, their claim was more than merely moral. In his 14 points Wilson had declared that the Allies would disarm as far as "internal safety" permitted. In the Covenant of the League this was whittled down to a "reduction" of armaments to the limits of "national safety." Obviously, the defeated countries had a right to claim the fulfilment of this latter promise at least. Its repudiation on the part of the Allies or, what was equivalent to this, an acknowledgment of the final failure to fulfil the promise, would inevitably have raised the question of the rearming of the defeated countries. This was the simple reason why governments continued to pretend that the cause of disarmament was progressing at a time when in their hearts they knew that the opposite was the case. A confession of failure would have brought matters to a head. Let us remember that the League of Nations could not be expected to function effectively, or, for that matter, to function in the long run at all, unless equality of status

was assured to its members, unless the victorious and the defeated nations were on the same international footing. Thus general disarmament was not only a means of avoiding an armaments race which would lead to a war even more terrible than the last, but it was an immediate necessity if a crisis in the existence of the League was to be averted. The so-called Versailles system could not last. It had either to lead to general disarmament or to the rearmament of the defeated countries. This was more or less clearly understood by all governments concerned since the middle of the twenties. Much real heroism, as in Arthur Henderson's selfless and persevering stewardship, as well as a vast amount of diplomatic make-believe on the part of the various governments was expended in the attempt to escape this dilemma. Ultimately, general disarmament was bound to fail, as long as the economic organisation of the separate countries made it impossible for the governments of these countries to proceed to an international organisation of economic life on a big scale. (On the whole, the story of the Disarmament Conference bore out the truth of the socialist contention that capitalist states are unable to organise peace.) However, even a partial agreement on the reduction of armaments would have been of great value. Time would have been gained which could be used for the overhauling of the social system. But not even such a breathing space was achieved. France refused to reduce her armaments unless her safety against German *revanche* was assured beforehand. Germany refused to agree to any arrangement that would have amounted to an acceptance of an inferiority of status. Unless the French disarmed to a sufficient degree she was to be allowed to rearm up to the French level. France, as aforesaid, refused to disarm unless her former allies declared that they would stand by her in case of need. Such assurances could be provided either by alliances or regional agreements, such as the extension of the Locarno agreement, or collectively, as foreshadowed in article 16 of the Covenant of the League. And so we are

back to our vicious circle once more. For the claim to collective security called for the counter-claim of revision, that is, mainly, territorial revision. In short, no advance towards disarmament was possible, unless it could be made clear what the new organisation of Europe would be like. Nothing less served the purpose. The disarmament conferences were bound to fail as long as England and France were unable to reach an agreement on collective security.

Thus the inevitable came to pass. Since Hitler's rise to power Germany became more and more impatient of the endless prevarications of the Disarmament Conference. Germany left both the League and the Conference. Ultimately France had to accept a much greater measure of German rearmament than Germany had offered to content herself with. England discovered too late that she herself was in need of collective security as much as France. Of all forms of equality of status the most nefarious was achieved in the equal right of all to follow the course of a suicidal armaments race.

### **Protection of Racial Minorities**

The last group of complaints concerned the treatment of racial minorities. The majority of the territorial changes brought about by the Treaties was an outcome of the Wilsonian doctrine of the self-determination of the peoples. But the establishment of new national states, such as Czechoslovakia, the resurrection of old ones, such as Poland, the enlargement of existing ones, as in the case of Rumania and Yugoslavia, while liberating many millions from alien rule, incidentally resulted in the transfer of a very considerable number of formerly dominant peoples to the rule of their former subjects. We have mentioned the transfer of the Magyars and Hungarian Jews to the new states of the Little Entente. Similarly, Germans were transferred to Poland and Italy. On the other hand, the position of the Poles who remained in Germany, of the foreign nationalities who stayed in Hungary—they were few indeed—needed

safeguarding. Accordingly, the Treaties imposed upon Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary, etc. the obligation of a fair treatment of the racial minorities entrusted to their rule. The protection offered to the racial minorities concerned in the main their cultural liberties—the use of their mother tongue at their schools, in local administration, and so on. Italy as a victorious great power was not forced to give formal assurances of this kind, although the German population of the Southern Tyrol stood badly in need of such. In fact, the enforced italianisation of the German people of the Southern Tyrol is one of the most striking instances of the abuse of power by a dominant nationality determined to deprive a highly cultured people of their ancient language and customs by sheer political pressure. Yet the case of the Southern Tyrol is remarkable also in another way. It shows clearly that racial issues by themselves will not separate nations permanently, unless coupled with the claim to territorial revision. The Southern Tyrolese are Germans of the oldest stock. Before the War they belonged to the Austrian Empire, and the new Austria is a purely German state. Hitler's Germany again, is rightly believed to be highly sensitive to the cultural complaints of all Germans living outside the borders of Germany, whether in Czechoslovakia, Poland, or, for that matter, in the African parts of the British Empire. And yet, neither Austria nor Germany has ever actually taken the cause of the Southern Tyrolese before an international forum. Austria was too weak to sustain such a claim; Hitler had based his friendship with Italian Fascism on his openly professed determination *not* to raise the issue of the Southern Tyrol. In the absence of a demand for territorial revision the denationalisation of the Germans of the Southern Tyrol never became a political issue. Wherever there is a claim for frontier revision the complaints of the racial minorities beyond the frontiers keep the public of their mother countries in a state of permanent agitation. Their (unfortunately often justified) complaints are used as a lever to force the political issue



of the revision of the frontiers to the fore. Consequently the states thus attacked are less inclined than ever to listen patiently to the complaints of their subjects of alien race, as they suspect them, though sometimes unjustly, of wanting to break away from their new country. Any concessions made to them may, under the circumstances, easily be represented as a political success of the forces of disaffection. Such an attitude on the part of the dominant nation, besides being a breach of international obligations, is obviously both short-sighted and unfair. Still, once more it proves, that the demand for revision of frontiers is at the heart of any and every kind of revision claim.

We can now gauge the true meaning and significance of revisionism in terms of practical politics. Territorial revision was hardly ever raised as an immediate issue. To do this might have easily precipitated a war. Yet the revision issue continued to overshadow post-war politics in Europe. The defeated countries stood for it either in their own name, as Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria, or, as a matter of solidarity, as Austria and Turkey. Two great powers, Russia and Italy, supported the revision claim. In practice this meant that on the numerous controversial questions arising out of the control of disarmament, the demilitarised zones, the limitation of armaments, the enforcing of reparations, and so on, they sided with the defeated countries. In this sense Russia, since 1922, Italy since 1928, stood in the revisionist front. They were opposed to any strengthening of collective security unless the road to revision was opened up first to the defeated states. Accordingly, they supported the claim of the defeated countries to equality of status and opposed all efforts aiming at the establishment of a League executive, an international police force, or any other instrument for carrying sanctions into effect. At the long series of conferences on financial and economic reconstruction, on the planning of regional customs groups, with their numerous plans and counter-plans, the revisionists invariably co-operated in such a

fashion as to defeat any attempt on the part of the other side to separate the members of the revisionist group or to make any one of them dependent on France, Poland, or a member of the Little Entente. Whatever suggestion, plan or offer of help was put forward in the Danubian basin, or, for that matter, in Central Europe, during this period, invariably it met with the same fate. If the suggested scheme appeared to favour a member of one group more than that of another, it immediately brought the other members of the less favoured group to their feet to torpedo the plan, even though, if successful, it would have carried substantial economic advantages to all concerned. The mere suspicion of enemy origin was sufficient to compromise even the wisest suggestion, and no genuinely collective plan was ever put forward. Nor could such a thing be reasonably expected to happen. The very existence of such a plan would have presupposed precisely that agreement on the political problems of Europe, the lack of which was at the bottom of all the difficulties.

## THE LEAGUE AND THE GREAT POWERS

**Articles 16 and 19 of the Covenant**

THE ARENA in which all political forces clashed was the League of Nations. The defeated countries and their political friends stood for revision; the victorious countries, as represented by France and her allies, stood for collective security. The League, which had been set up as the guardian of the *status quo*, or of frontiers as they were, should be made into the basis of collective security. This was the policy of the French group. It resulted in the demand for the strengthening of the executive powers of the League, by making military sanctions effective. Article 16 of the Covenant had set up the principle of collective action of League members against an aggressor. The French group insisted that this article should be "implemented" by the adoption of definite commitments on the part of member states to come to one another's assistance in case of an attack on any one of them.

The defeated states opposed the strengthening of the League as long as this would have meant the strengthening of a political apparatus designed to keep things as they are. Revision first, was their demand. Article 19 of the Covenant had set out the principle that treaties, which had become inapplicable, could be revised. The defeated countries rightly contended that this referred also to the Peace Treaties themselves. They insisted that article 19 should be made effective by the adoption of a procedure under which revision claims could be formally raised. As long as this was not the case, they would not hear of the "implementing" of article 16. For, under article 16 war would have been made against them. Under article 19 it was their frontiers that would be peacefully revised.

### France and her Eastern Allies

On the whole, the revisionist states as a group were, of course, less friendly to the League than the anti-revisionist states. France and her smaller allies had set up a system of treaties of regional security which was based on the Covenant of the League of Nations. The potential enemies under these treaties were Germany and Hungary. The Franco-Polish alliance was directed against possible German aggression; the Little Entente was a defensive alliance intended to safeguard the neighbours of Hungary against her revisionist claims. Although these alliances were meant to uphold the *status quo*, that is existing frontiers, the defeated countries resented them as much as if they were military alliances of the pre-War type. The anti-revisionist countries vainly argued that their alliances could have no aggressive aims, as they were satisfied with their frontiers and did not wish to have them changed. They insisted that these alliances were meant to take the place of general League sanctions and could become effective only if and when the League decided that aggression had taken place. After all, they argued, as long as some members of the League refused to commit themselves to collective security pacts, and, thereby, continued to hold up effective sanctions against the aggressor, why should not the others be permitted to do their best to establish regional security by committing themselves to stand together against an aggressor? As in all other respects, so also in regard to the League, the revisionist and anti-revisionist states presented completely opposite lines of policy.

### The U.S.S.R.

The foreign policy of all the great powers in Europe was, in the main, determined by their attitude to revisionism. France and Germany were the leading powers in the opposing groups. But Germany did not stand alone. Russia, although she did not claim the revision of her own frontiers, supported every endeavour to weaken and undermine the system of Versailles. The Russian

Revolution lived in perpetual fear of a repetition of the post-War interventions that had been organised against her by the allied countries. Her territory had been invaded over and over again by counter-revolutionary armies supported by the French and British reactionary circles. Clemenceau had declared that the policy of the Allies should be to isolate Soviet Russia from the rest of Europe with the help of a *cordon sanitaire*, that is, an anti-bolshevik encirclement. Revisionist Germany regarded Russia as her natural ally and in 1922, in Rapallo, Tchitcherin and Rathenau signed a Treaty of friendship which remained for more than ten years one of the stable factors in European politics. The German general staff favoured the idea of military co-operation with Russia; and the German industrialists willingly granted credits to her under the large-scale state schemes for the furtherance of exports to Russia. Germany could always count on the diplomatic co-operation of Soviet Russia as well as of her friends, amongst whom Turkey deserves to be mentioned. That state had been snowed under by the Treaties, and was indebted for her resurrection apart from her own prowess, to the assistance of the Soviets. Turkey could always be relied upon to back the revisionists.

### Italy

But more important than Russia's or Turkey's goodwill, was Italy's determination to give her diplomatic support to revisionism. By doing so she split the front of the former allies and put military power at the disposal of revisionism. Germany was disarmed. Soviet Russia was in no position to fight, owing to military weakness which had resulted from the disorganisation of her industries. Hungary's and Bulgaria's territorial claims could now no more be lightly dismissed by Jugoslavia, the common neighbour of these two countries (and, incidentally, Italy's rival in the Adriatic), and Italy. France had to take serious account of Italy's revisionist sympathies to which that country was able to give strong support as a permanent member of the League Council. Italy's

motives were purely egoistic. Apart from the advantage of increased pressure on Yugoslavia and France, her two rivals in the Mediterranean, she was enabled to play a considerable rôle at small cost to herself by using the revisionist group of states sometimes as a screen and sometimes as a battering-ram to further her ends. Mussolini deliberately made use of the tension existing between the national fronts to make Italy the index of the balance of power in Europe. To this purpose she more often than not proclaimed herself the protector of the revisionists, obstructing the "implementing" of article 16 on sanctions, opposing collective security and undermining the authority of the League as best she could.

### **Great Britain**

Great Britain together with France had been chiefly responsible for the establishment of the League of Nations. But, while France felt directly endangered by the unstable condition of affairs in Europe and made security the keynote of her foreign policy, Great Britain's position as an island power was altogether more favourable.

We have seen how English public opinion braced up to the task of facing the post-war problems. Fair play was a national maxim which tended to range the British on the side of the losers of the Great War. In fact, British policy was on the whole revisionist in sympathy. Though not openly and professedly, yet purposefully and deliberately, Downing Street was supporting the defeated countries in their endeavour to loosen the shackles of the Treaties. Of course, no great power can stand officially for a policy of territorial change without upsetting conditions altogether and thus endangering peace. This explains why England never formally accepted the claim of the defeated countries to revision. But in fact she was found siding with Germany against France, with Hungary against the Little Entente, with Bulgaria against Yugoslavia on more than one occasion, though usually not on territorial issues (such were hardly ever openly mentioned), but on the various other questions that

divided the two national fronts. On disarmament, reparations, racial minorities, and so on, Britain exerted her influence as a rule in favour of the defeated states. She was allowing her own armaments to lag behind those of other countries with a view to the possibilities of a general limitation of armaments for which her governments were pressing, even if with a varying degree of vigour; the Balfour declaration on war debts limited her interest in reparations and permitted her to take a broad view on the subject. Financial reconstruction in various Central European states was mainly due to her good services offered through the League of Nations. The currencies of Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland and Greece were stabilised with the help of the League loans, a performance of definite value, though only of transitory effect. During the early half of the twenties she consistently opposed the application of strong measures intended to enforce reparations from Germany, e.g. the occupation of the Ruhr by France. Also she tried to discourage the conclusion of military alliances between France on the one hand and the member states of the Little Entente as well as Poland on the other. Incidentally, such a policy on the part of Great Britain was sufficiently accounted for by her traditional tendency of restoring the balance of power on the Continent by giving her support to the opponents of the strongest military power, in this case, France. But arguments based on the "balance of power" were soon reinforced by more up-to-date considerations. Great Britain took long views. The Versailles system could not last. Germany would have to be accorded equality of status before long or she would take it. Either by general disarmament or, failing that, by such a reduction of armaments as would meet a rearming Germany half way, an equality of status had to be achieved. The greater the disparity in the status of the parties, that is to say, the greater the inferiority of the defeated compared to the victorious countries, the worse would the shock be, when the system collapsed. So Britain was striving to level out the patent differences in

power and standing which separated the victors from the vanquished. Inevitably her weight in the councils of the world was thrown into the balance of revisionism. It must be clearly understood, however, that, in following such a course, Great Britain's main aim and purpose was peace. In order to maintain and safeguard peace she supported revision. A revision that threatened peace would always find her ranged on the side of the anti-revisionists. In other words, she favoured revision by peaceful means only; the use of force as a means of gaining revision was never countenanced by her. While Italian revisionism discounted the value of peace, Great Britain was revisionist and peaceful at the same time.

But revisionism was not enough. Without a simultaneous strengthening of collective security it was doomed to fail. Fear of *revanche* was the mighty ally of anti-revisionism. Unless this fear could be allayed it would block all progress towards revision. But what did Great Britain actually do to improve security? What did she do to strengthen the hands of the League of the Nations as a guardian of peace; to implement article 16 of the Covenant that deals with the "sanctions" which are to be applied collectively in case of unprovoked aggression?

When, in 1935, Mussolini's African act of aggression made this country turn towards the League of Nations as the great modern forum of international jurisdiction, many millions of Englishmen heard for the first time of "League sanctions." In fact, not before weeks had elapsed, in which the press of this country was resounding with the cry for action to stop Italy, did the word "sanctions" become familiar to English ears. Nothing could prove more conclusively than this simple fact, how far Great Britain's foreign policy was in the last sixteen years from following a genuine League line. As every Englishman knows by this time "sanctions" are the heart of collective security, and collective security is the essence of the League.

Great Britain had for many years given her warm support to the League. But all attempts of the French



to induce her to commit herself to the principle of mutual assistance to the point of applying military sanctions against the aggressor were in vain. When Ramsay Macdonald in 1924, as Prime Minister of the first Labour Government, signed the Geneva Protocols in which the treble principle of mutual assistance, arbitration and disarmament was embodied in a carefully prepared document, his successors hardly thought it worth while to give their reasons for rejecting it. Speaking in general, British public opinion vehemently opposed the idea of "new commitments" on the Continent, especially if they were apparently directed towards the satisfaction of French demands for security.

There was more than one reason for this attitude. Although in the light of subsequent events it might appear as the result of mere political shortsightedness and of outlived isolationist notions dear to die-hard minds, such a view would miss important aspects of the situation. Any general system of mutual assistance was bound to involve a great naval power more easily and more frequently in war than others. For, in practice, League sanctions would, more often than not, amount to a British blockade of the seaborne traffic of the aggressor. Even though most of the other countries might stay outside the conflict and remain neutral, Great Britain would, practically, be at war, whensoever there was a disturbance of peace on the globe. Besides, this was the surest way to embroil Great Britain with the U.S.A., for that country was neither a member of the League nor was she inclined to accept the principles of blockade as practised by Great Britain and the League powers. The U.S.A. stood traditionally for the Freedom of the Seas, which in actual practice meant the refusal to acknowledge maritime law as understood by the British. Moreover, the British had always made it a rule not to commit themselves in advance on issues of war and peace. Why should they depart from this time-honoured practice, and pander to the French mania for security and to the spirit of obstruction against the idea of a Treaty revision

which, to the English, appeared a matter of plain justice and commonsense? Under whatever title the French and their allies proposed to discuss collective security, they did not find the British keen to join in. Whether it was Herriot's Protocol of mutual assistance, Briand's Pan-Europe, Tardieu's International police force, Litvinov's definition of the aggressor, or Paul Boncour's belts of regional security, Great Britain maintained an attitude of aloofness, if not of open hostility.

### Locarno

With one notable exception. In 1925 Great Britain resolved to take part in an act of regional security which remained for more than ten years the safeguard of Western European peace. The Treaty of Locarno offered a guarantee to France and Belgium against an unprovoked attack by Germany. Formally the treaty was reciprocal, and Germany, too, was safeguarded against a French attack, a provision which did not appear quite superfluous in view of the invasion of the Ruhr by Poincaré's troops in 1923. Still, France, not Germany, had been the driving force of the Locarno treaty which was acclaimed by Frenchmen as Great Britain's one important contribution to collective security. Though the commitment was regional, for it was restricted to Germany's western frontier and the demilitarised Rhineland zone, and, moreover, left the actual decision concerning military intervention to Great Britain herself, still, the principle of mutual assistance against unprovoked aggression was clearly and definitely enounced in the treaty. Here again, as in the case of revisionism, Great Britain acted in accordance with her traditional foreign policy, of which the defence of the Low Countries against an invader formed a part. But, as with revisionism, the traditional motives of her policy were, in this case, too, reinforced by more modern arguments, such as the recognition of the need for increased security if France and her allies should be induced to venture into the troubled seas of revisionism. Indeed, by refusing to

safeguard Poland against an unprovoked German aggression, Great Britain, in fact, encouraged peaceful revisionism on the Eastern frontiers of Germany. Still, with Locarno, England drew somewhat closer to the League. This was to be her last contribution to collective security in the course of the next decade. On the strength of Locarno she declined, more consistently than ever, to "implement" article 16 of the Covenant on sanctions.

Her early sympathies for revisionism proved that Great Britain's policy was looking farther ahead. Yet the scant support she accorded to the principle of collective security makes her policy appear to-day as if she had not been looking forward far enough. If there was a chance of liquidating the so-called Versailles system smoothly and peacefully, by common consent of the defeated and the victorious countries, it was given away when the Geneva protocol of the year 1924 was rejected by the House of Commons.

THE NEW ALIGNMENT IN EUROPE: FASCISM  
AND DEMOCRACY

## CHAPTER I

## THE RISE OF FASCISM

**The New Armaments Race**

WITH ADOLF HITLER's rise to the Chancellorship in Germany on the 30th of January, 1933, the second post-War period opens. The Versailles treaty system is wound up. Germany leaves the League of Nations. She denounces all restrictions on armaments and starts to re-arm on a gigantic scale. Austria and Hungary also re-arm. Power policy rules the day. France tries to increase the pace of her armaments; Russia sets up the largest army the world has ever seen in peace time; Italy and Japan put the last atom of their energy into the increasing of their armaments; Great Britain follows in the wake and launches the biggest armaments programme of her history. The collapse of the Versailles system introduces an armaments race of unprecedented dimensions and intensity.

Even this is not all. That the breakdown of the Versailles system should release the forces of revisionism and bring them into conflict with the powers that profited from the war, was no more than could be expected. Yet, revision and collective security, simultaneously effected, might still have opened up a reasonable prospect of a not too painful process of adjustment in a chastened world. France had learnt that the treaties were not sacrosanct, and Great Britain had discovered that she herself was in some need of collective security. The claims to territorial revision had, in the course of time,

been reduced to manageable proportions. Hungary and Bulgaria were showing signs of a moderate outlook on frontier revision, and Germany herself, as the subsequent ten years' arrangement on the Polish Corridor proved, was well able to accommodate herself to the new conditions. If national antagonisms alone had to be considered, the establishment of collective security on the basis of a reasonable measure of revision was still not altogether beyond the normal powers of statesmanship.

### **National and Social Alignments**

Unfortunately, new troubles were added to the old. Differing social interests and ideas gave rise to acute tensions in international life, which cut across the national alignments, sometimes diminishing, but at other times increasing vastly the intensity of their conflicts. National antagonism continued to dominate world affairs, but social conflict was superimposed on the pattern.

In the new world alignment Germany occupied a pivotal position. Her old rivalry with France remained the main source of all troubles in the national sphere, while her new antagonism to Soviet Russia was the result of her self-set task in the social sphere. Thus Germany became the driving force in both directions. France and Russia both found themselves on the defensive in regard to Germany, although the reasons for the attack which they feared were of a widely different nature. By withdrawing from the revisionist front and joining the camp of collective security, Russia created a new situation in Europe. In the new alignment the democratic countries and the U.S.S.R. tend to draw closer together, while the Fascist countries establish more or less permanent alliances to promote the downfall of democracy. Although the relationships between the imperialist great powers, Germany and Italy, to which, in the Far East, Japan must be added, are uneasy and often strained, yet as a rule these powers manage to co-operate against the democratic states and Soviet Russia under the slogan of "saving the world from Bolshevism." Italy and Japan do

not see eye to eye during the Abyssinian war; Germany and Italy quarrel over Austria. Yet the latter great powers assist one another when Italy invades Abyssinia, as well as later on, when they jointly intervene in favour of Franco's Spain; Germany and Japan proclaim an anti-Communist alliance directed against Soviet Russia.

On the other hand, Great Britain, France, and, in the Western hemisphere, the United States of America, also draw closer. Though far from forming a military alliance, they show a growing tendency towards some degree of co-operation. But their relationships are easily disturbed by the fact that France for obvious military reasons links up closer with the other continental power of her group, the U.S.S.R., than Great Britain and the U.S.A. feel warranted. The great differences obtaining between the economic systems of Soviet Russia and the other industrial countries, give Fascist diplomacy a welcome chance of driving a wedge between Russia and the rest. The rise of Fascism is at the heart of the social wars and civil wars of our time.

### **Democracy and Working Class Influence**

The War destroyed the three great ruling dynasties of the Continent: the Hapsburg, the Hohenzollern, and the Romanov. Their ancient empires were turned into democratic republics, the feudal aristocracy was dispossessed by agrarian revolutions, and the capitalists had to relinquish rule to the common people. With many qualifications and in various different ways this happened in that vast area of Central and Eastern Europe where more than half a dozen new states were born in the course of the process of national and social rejuvenation. In Germany and Austria-Hungary the Trade Unions and the working class parties played a decisive rôle in setting up the new state which was left in a condition of almost complete helplessness by the general collapse that followed on the defeat of the armies in the field. Nowhere had defeat been caused by revolution at home; on the contrary, the post-War revolutions were simply the

outcome of military catastrophe. No wonder that the working class felt proud of their achievement. They had saved society from anarchy and organised a democratic community on the ruins of the old. No wonder that they set their imprint on the constitution of the new states, their social legislation, their factory laws and general welfare administration. Imperial Germany, with her caste system and Junker snobbery, had seen the former saddler's apprentice, Ebert, become head of the state in lieu of the Kaiser. Imperial Austria, where a proud aristocracy had held sway, was transformed almost overnight into a world famous metropolis of a fine working class culture. But the former ruling classes refused to accept defeat. Their insistent efforts to re-establish their rule were the mainspring of the counter-revolutionary movements out of which Fascism emerged.

The mechanism which maintained the working class in power was universal suffrage and representative government. In short, it was democracy. Against her political and industrial institutions the counter-revolutionary drive was directed. To fight working class influence by destroying democracy was invariably the Fascist aim.

### **The Russian Revolution**

In Russia the age-old abominations of Tsarist autocracy had reaped the harvest they deserved. In order to safeguard newly won democracy against the immediate threat of Tsarist counter-revolution the working class had set up their own rule, which, under the backward conditions of the country, led to a Socialist revolution of a unique character. Ultimately, the Bolshevik revolution was probably the only means of preventing the return of Tsarism and the unspeakable cruelties with which triumphant white terror takes its revenge on the forces of revolution. When judging of the forms of Russian State Socialism it must be borne in mind that Russia was lacking in three things which Western European countries possessed—a literate population, an industrial system and democratic traditions. Thus

capitalist reactionaries could fasten upon the inevitable weaknesses of the Russian Socialist experiment in order to discredit Socialism itself, while in reality it was the great industrial and educational achievements of the U.S.S.R. which singled her out as the object of their unyielding hatred. But the Bolshevik bogey could be made to serve still another purpose. Democracy had led to predominant working class influence in Central Europe; working class influence had led to Bolshevism in Russia. Why not use the Bolshevik bogey as a weapon against democracy so as to block the main avenue of working class influence once and for all? Thus the great idea of Fascism was born: to fight democracy under the cover of an anti-Communist crusade.

### **Fascism and Democracy**

For a modern industrial society, in the long run, is either democratic or Fascist. It is either based on the ideal of common human equality and responsibility or on their negation. But democracy cannot be maintained under the conditions of present-day life, unless the principles of democracy are extended to the whole of society, including the economic system itself. This is commonly called Socialism. Those who wish to strike at the roots of democracy direct their attacks against Socialism, thus trying to exploit the prejudices of the masses in order to keep them more easily in subservience.

The spirit of Fascism can be most readily understood when contrasted with the ideals of Socialism against which it is most pointedly directed.

Fascism is imbued with a spirit of extreme nationalism. Socialism tends, by its very nature, towards international solutions. If its ideals are to be discredited, then pacifism must rank as a crime and readiness to co-operate with other nations and races as an abomination.

Fascism exalts the use of violence and believes in the principle of eternal warfare between nations and peoples. This again is the necessary counterpart to the Socialist contention that the international organisation of the



world will do away with the need for wars and that coercion can be justified only as an inevitable means of ensuring a fuller measure of freedom for all.

Fascism looks to absolutism as the natural form of the political organisation of human community. Self-government, representative institutions, rights of citizenship, the very idea of liberty and freedom of the individual are anathema to it. Socialism is the fulfilment of the idea of freedom in a modern industrial society. It is governed by the principle of the self-realisation of the human personality, the ideal of the self-expression of every human being. The demand for the communal ownership of the means of production is directed precisely towards the safeguarding of that end. Socialism ceases to be Socialism unless it is striving towards such a transformation of society as would guarantee the greatest measure of spontaneous co-operation and responsible initiative to every individual. Under the name of the leadership principle Fascism has introduced the political bondage of the masses as an ideal that marks the final stage of the development of human society. Such a deification of slavery is inevitable in a philosophy which wants to uproot the Socialist ideal of perfect freedom in the hearts of men.

### **The Totalitarian State and National Socialism**

In the Central and Eastern European countries, where the working class was in the ascendancy after the war, a counterdrive set in sooner or later with a view to abolishing the advantages that had accrued to the Trade Unions and working class parties. In Hungary the Communists had set up a short-lived régime which ended in the restoration of the former ruling classes amidst orgies of white terror. In Italy the workers had embarked in 1919 upon a series of sit-down strikes which amounted to an occupation of the factories, although actually no violence had been used. This time it became apparent that the lower middle classes ceased to follow the lead of the working classes when these were engaged in stopping the wheels of

industry without any definite plan of their own how to make them go round again. The term Fascism itself dates from Mussolini's "groups of assault" whose task it was to invade Trade Union centres, workers' clubs, local Labour headquarters or Trade Councils, and demolish the premises, beating up or killing their political opponents. As in Hungary, in Italy too, counter-revolution accused the workers of lack of patriotism. They rightly contrasted the peaceful and sober spirit of the workers with the frenzy of nationalism by which they themselves were inspired. Wherever counter-revolution took on the typical Fascist form, the nation as a whole turned its energies towards the open or clandestine increase of its armaments, and the suppression of any endeavour other than that of preparing for the day on which those armaments would be used in exploits of conquest. The "totalitarian state" is the whole people, organised for "total war," i.e., for a war in which every particle of the nation has ceased to have any other function or value apart from that of being sacrificed in a supreme effort to annihilate the enemy. Such a war cannot begin with the starting of hostilities nor cease when they end. In years and decades of apparently peaceful preparation the energies of man must be diverted into the channels which will increase his effectiveness as a unit in total war to a maximum. The biological material of human life itself must be subordinated to this single purpose. Once war has been accepted as the final answer to the problem of history no other outcome is logically possible. The Fascist, if he is to be consistent, cannot escape the conclusion that not the spiritual but the animal elements in the composition of man are man's true nature. The totalitarian state can be summed up as the ideal of a pedigree farm dedicated to the raising of a human breed that in case of war will give most trouble to the enemy and least trouble to its rulers. It is this perfect appropriateness of means to ends that makes German Racialism the true form of Fascism. National Socialism is not a form of Socialism. It is the deadly enemy of all Socialism.

THE NEW ALIGNMENT OF THE GREAT  
POWERS

GERMAN FASCISM has set out to destroy Socialism in Russia. The whole of its foreign policy is based on this idea. In Hitler's conviction all capitalist states ought to join in the common task of defeating the home country of Bolshevism. Germany deems herself the "champion of European civilisation against the sub-human barbarism of Asia." She proclaims herself the rallying point of all enemies of Socialism. This mission that she has chosen to assume is a very real asset to her foreign policy; she is drawing permanently great strength from it. Accordingly, she avoids all ambiguity in this respect. Her irreducible enmity to the U.S.S.R. is a basic essential of European politics. Germany and Russia act as the two poles of social tension in the present international situation. The effects of this development on the alignment of powers in Europe has been deep and lasting.

The U.S.S.R. left the revisionist front. As soon as she became convinced that National Socialist hostility against "Marxism" was an essential of Germany's foreign policy she reversed the attitude she had been consistently taking up ever since November, 1917. Up to 1933 the U.S.S.R. had been more or less relying on the oncoming of a world revolution which would protect her in the future against an encirclement by capitalist states. She suspected the League of Nations of being a rallying point of capitalist intervention. She encouraged revisionism in order to drive a wedge between the capitalist states and to advance the disruption of the Versailles system. If revisionism led to war, this would bring world revolution nearer.

Now she cut loose from revisionism and veered round to the other side. Step by step she drew closer to the anti-revisionist camp which was upholding collective security, and landed in the League of Nations. She kept to her traditional principle of trying to prevent her encirclement by supporting one group against the other, only that it was the anti-revisionist group of states she sided with this time. Yet there was a very great difference. By joining the *status quo* powers and the League, world revolution was ruled out as part of Russia's foreign policy. Her interests would not be served any more by a war. The U.S.S.R. became a factor of peace.

The entrance of Russia into the League system had important bearings on European politics. Russia had been only vaguely interested in European affairs. Although since the success of the five year plans her military power was on the increase she remained in a sense a non-European power. Her support of revisionism was merely diplomatic; her army did not figure in the picture. This considerably enhanced the strategic importance of the junior great powers, Poland and Italy. From 1919 to 1933 they had actually played the rôle of great powers in Europe, although in reality they were powers of limited interests and even more of limited resources compared with the great powers proper. Russia's entering the ring naturally tended to lessen the weight Poland and Italy carried in the councils of Europe. Though the new development did not make them change their line altogether, still it marked a dent upon it. Poland remained anti-revisionist but drew nearer to Germany, and Italy, though she remained revisionist, moved closer to France. Poland's policy became somewhat of a mystery from this time to all but those of the inner circle of her councils. Italy, too, followed anything but a straight line. Both these powers had their eyes on France and had therefore to adjust their line to the altered position into which France's friendship with Russia had put them. Poland, France's ally could not any more unconditionally count on France's support, as that country had now to

take heed also of Russia. Therefore Poland deemed it wise to come to a working agreement with Germany so that she could feel safe for the time being. Italy on the contrary had been anything but friendly to France. She had followed the line of putting a pressure upon France in order to persuade her in this way to make some colonial concessions to Italy in Africa, and also to weaken her support of Yugoslavia, Italy's neighbour in the Adriatic. Italy's sympathies for revisionism sprang from kindred sources. The necessity of coming to terms with Italy was to be impressed on France. Unless she took the hint, the military force of Italy would be, in case of a show down, ranged on the side of Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and so on. Russia's new orientation cut across this Italian stratagem. In view of Russia's great military strength France would in future be less dependent upon Italy. Mussolini, who had been on the worst of terms with France, made his peace with her on the 7th of January, 1935. Laval declared France to be disinterested in the economic future of Abyssinia. It is a matter of history that the seeds of the African war were sown on that day.

But Italy had been affected in yet another and more direct fashion by the volcanic birth of Hitler's Third Reich. Here was an added reason for Mussolini's speedy agreement with Laval. The sudden re-emergence of German imperialism had damped Italy's revisionist ardour. The Austrian question had been, for some 15 years, safely shelved. Though a defeated state, she was not revisionist. Her just complaint of having been forbidden by the Treaty to join Germany was but hesitantly supported on Germany's part and appeared to become less insistent. Overnight everything changed. The Third Reich claimed union with Austria, and Italy was landed in a highly uncomfortable position. Having supported revisionism for almost a decade she found herself confronted by a revisionist success that threatened her very safety and integrity. If Austria united with Germany, the Third Reich would become Italy's neighbour on the Brenner, i.e. the Tyrolese Alps. The Reich might then

covetously look towards a port on the Adriatic; she might block Italy's communications with Hungary in case of war, a danger that did not threaten from the weak Austria; she might take up vigorously her former line of expansion on the Balkans and reduce Italy to impotence in the Adriatic; and almost certainly she would foment unrest amongst the Germans of the Southern Tyrol, thereby undermining Italy's most vulnerable frontier zone. Mussolini countered the danger by establishing his own dictatorship in Austria through the Heimwehr which was let loose against the Socialist defenders of the democratic constitution in February, 1934. Italian troops on the Brenner continued to watch over Austria's independence from 1933 to 1936. Obviously, here was a point of common agreement with France. During these years Italo-German relationships were never quite free of the Austrian shadow.

Great Britain herself was, for a time, adversely affected in her freedom of diplomatic action by Russia's unexpected reappearance in the European system. The comparative weakness of Great Britain in these critical years was often remarked and rightly ascribed to a variety of reasons. One of them was certainly the fact that Great Britain was unable to bring into line her policy in the Pacific Ocean with her European commitments. In the Pacific she had constantly to take account of Japan, although, or rather because, she was tacitly committed by her whole naval and Empire policy to side with the United States if it came to a show down between them and Japan. For Great Britain's naval power was not strong enough to protect her outlying dominions and possessions against Japanese aggression without grave risks. Nor were the U.S.A. able or willing to protect them during the period in question. Great Britain's policy consisted practically in putting off the evil day, if ever it had to come, on which a Japanese-American conflict forced her to confront Japan in Far Eastern waters. In effect, Britain was striving to make it worth while to Japan to keep the peace, by *not* putting down her foot

against Japan's tendency to gain a hold on the Asiatic continent, whether this happened at the cost of the Russians in Manchuria, of the Chinese in North-China, or, finally, at the cost of the Chinese and the British themselves in Central and Southern China. At a time when, in the Far East, Russia hardly counted as a military power, and both America and Great Britain were still weak on the Ocean, the obvious solution of grouping the three countries together in defence against Japanese imperialism, offered less security than may have seemed at the first glance. A coalition of weak partners trying to stop a comparatively strong country may be sufficient to induce that country to strike while they are weak, without offering a military safeguard of victory to the coalition. This, however, by no means does imply, that Great Britain could, and, therefore, should, not have stood in the way of Japanese aggressive plans in the Far East in 1931. Instead of encouraging her, as actually happened, Great Britain, with the help of the U.S.A. and the League, could have very well enormously increased the cost of aggression to Japan and slowed down thereby her march to a snail's pace without any risk of a war. That Sir John Simon, instead, gratuitously made the Far East safe for Japanese aggression, has proved by subsequent events to have been a blunder both of a psychological and an intellectual order.

Be this as it may, Great Britain found herself in a position in the Pacific in which she could not simply veto Japan's trespassing on Russian interests. In other words, Great Britain persistently kept on the Japanese side in Japan's conflict with Russia. And unless there was a complete change in the balance of powers in the Pacific she was almost bound to do so.

Though not much was said about it at the time the U.S.S.R.'s admission to the League embarrassed Great Britain. As a member of the League and supporter of collective security the U.S.S.R. would stand for the maintenance of peace, and against unprovoked aggression. She would be regarded by France as her natural ally in

Europe, especially in so far as Germany was concerned. But England also was committed under the Locarno agreements to side with France in case of unprovoked German aggression. Unless Great Britain decided to disinterest herself in the fate of Belgium and the Low Countries and, incidentally, to denounce the Locarno agreement, she could never be sure not to find herself some day in the same camp with Russia. But what, then, of Japan which, if Russia was entangled in a war, would almost certainly attack her? There was no getting away from the geographical fact that while the one frontier of the U.S.S.R. was on the Pacific Ocean, the other was in Europe. The two storm centres of the globe, the Amur region and the Rhineland, which had been isolated and separated from one another by an indifferent and neutral continent had been short-circuited. England might have to make up her mind whether to change her policy in the Pacific or in Europe, whether she would look on as a benevolent neutral on Japanese preparations to attack Outer Mongolia and Siberia or whether she would hold to Locarno and fight on the side of U.S.S.R. if that country and France joined in a common war of defence against Germany. Great Britain was unable to decide either way. This was perhaps the most important of the hidden reasons of her weakness in foreign affairs.

Germany's irreducible enmity to the U.S.S.R. which she continuously proclaimed as matter of principle became in this way a determining factor in our period of history. The more successful Germany was in forcing Soviet Russia as an issue in politics, the more England's liberty of action was impaired. Also Germany was giving a lead to Fascist aggression all over the world.



## GERMANY AND ITALY GO AHEAD

SINCE THE accession of Hitler to the Chancellorship of the Reich European politics reflect almost day by day the increasing pressure emanating from Germany:

**The March of Events**

In January, 1933, Hitler takes over. On February 27th the Reichstag is set on fire. The Communists are charged with the deed; they are outlawed. On October 14th Germany leaves the League of Nations. In January, 1934, a ten years' truce is concluded with Poland. Germany is now free to reach out for union with Austria and to organise Central Europe and the Danube against the U.S.S.R. On June 30th the Nazi Party is purged by the Führer himself. Hundreds of sub-leaders who have been pressing for social and economic reforms at home are shot. Hitler, the Army, and heavy industry take sole command. On July 25th the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss is murdered by the Nazi; their armed rising fails. On March 16th, 1935, Germany declares her intention to rearm on a big scale. Hitler, now head of the state in succession to Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, announces to Sir John Simon and Eden in Berlin the irreducible enmity of the Third Reich to the U.S.S.R. One year later Germany tears up the Treaty of Locarno and marches her troops into the Rhineland.

Slowly and gradually, but with inevitable necessity, these moves start a counter-move in Europe. In May, 1934, the U.S.S.R. decides that revision is only another word for another world war. In July, 1934, the French offer an Eastern Pact to Russia, Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic states, i.e., Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania. When Germany rejects, France

decides to conclude a pact of mutual assistance with Russia, leaving it open to Germany to join in on the basis of complete reciprocity. The U.S.S.R. asks for admittance to the League. On February 3rd, 1935, England and France agree in London on a memorandum in which they offer equality of status to Germany, on condition that she is willing to conclude a security pact. On May 2nd Laval signs a five year agreement with Litvinov; Stalin announces that the French Communists would henceforth support the French government's armaments policy. In August, the VII Comintern Congress reverses the Party's traditional tactics and declares in support of a Popular Front of anti-Fascist forces in all countries. On May 16th the U.S.S.R. signs a treaty with the Czech government on lines similar to those of the Franco-Russian Treaty. In June the results of the British Peace Ballot are published. More than 11,000,000 votes have been given in support of the League, several million voters declaring for military sanctions through the League. On November 14th the British electorate almost unanimously endorses the principle of collective security. In May, 1936, the French Chamber ratifies the Franco-Russian Treaty.

Apart from the Franco-Russian and, later on, the British attitude, Germany's action has to take account of several factors, viz., the independent line followed by Italy; the policy of the Vatican; the Little Entente; Germany's small neighbours.

### **Italy, the Protector of Austria**

The struggle for Austria separates Germany and Italy in this period. Italy remains revisionist and an opponent of the League, but she follows an independent line of her own. Her treaty with France in January, 1935, allows that country to move some 200,000 troops from the Italian frontier to the Maginot line on the German frontier. When, two months later, Germany denounces the disarmament provisions of Versailles, Italy joins at Stresa with Great Britain and France in a demonstration

of solidarity against treaty breakers. In the Rome Protocol of March, 1934, she sponsors an agreement of co-operation and consultation with Austria and Hungary, mainly as a counter-weight to German influence on the Danube. For Rump-Hungary naturally tends to make common cause with Germany whose triumphant march to military power kindles new Hungarian hopes of reconquering the old frontiers. Austria is held in the Italian orbit by the promise of military help against a German invasion. Moreover, the Roman Church and the aristocracy in that country look to Italy for support in planning the restoration of the Hapsburgs. The monarchy will help, so they hope, to keep Austria independent. Both in Abyssinia, and later, in Spain, Italy goes ahead on her own, justly counting on Germany's good will towards acts of Fascist conquest. But not until the military reverses suffered by the Italian "volunteers" in Spain press such a move upon her, does Italy compromise on Austria with the Third Reich. The "Berlin-Rome axis" in continental politics is a development of the year 1937.

### The Vatican in Central Europe

The Vatican proved a strong ally of Italy in Austria. In view of the conflict of the Third Reich with the Churches both Protestant and Catholic, the Holy See was most reluctant to encourage the union of Catholic Austria with the Third Reich. Since 1931 the Vatican was favouring a Catholic brand of the Corporate State. When Mussolini in 1934, hoping to ensure thereby the independence of Austria from Germany, called the Heimwehr *putsch* against the democratic republic, the new constitution was drafted on the lines of the Papal Encyclical of 1931. Although the Encyclical declared that a true Catholic could not also be a true Socialist, thereby ranging the Church on the side of the so-called anti-Marxian movements, yet the Vatican did not become wholly subservient to Italian Fascism nor to German National Socialism. The Holy See joined in their

denunciation of Communism and the U.S.S.R.; it favoured Mussolini's African invasion as well as his intervention in Spain, but it refused to allow the Church in Germany to be paganised. The Holy See backed up the German Protestants in their manly resistance to the foisting of the leadership principle and the Aryan clause into the Confessional Church.

### **The Little Entente**

Of the three states of the Little Entente Czechoslovakia alone consistently opposed German plans for the penetration of the Danube basin. The two other members of this grouping, Rumania and Jugoslavia, joined with Czechoslovakia in their common opposition to Hungarian revision claims, while not reacting to the same degree to the union of Austria with Germany. One of them at least, Jugoslavia, appeared to prefer the "Anschluss," that is to say the union of Austria with Germany to the restoration of the Hapsburgs, as the lesser of two evils. Moreover, Czechoslovakia had most to fear from Germany, Rumania from the U.S.S.R., and Jugoslavia from Italy. Czechoslovakia harboured some 3,000,000 Germans on her Western border, who had become increasingly restless since the rise of the Nazi across the frontier. Rumania had taken possession of Bessarabia during the Russian civil wars and felt uneasy on account of Russia's reluctance to acknowledge the loss of this territory of hers as final. Jugoslavia was faced with Italian expansion in the Adriatic, especially by the way of Albania, a small almost medieval state on the east coast of the Adriatic Sea which had become practically an Italian dependency in the course of the "twenties". But different, as their potential enemies were also their potential friends amongst the great powers. Czechoslovakia looked primarily to France and after 1933, also to Soviet Russia. Rumania depended for the safety of her Eastern frontier in case of war on a military alliance with Poland, and only secondarily, with France. Jugoslavia relied above all on France, but refused to accept

help from Soviet Russia. Thus Czechoslovakia alone remained unswervingly true to her French affiliation. When Poland drew closer to Germany, Rumania wavered in her allegiance to France, which was, incidentally, also affected by France's friendship with Russia. When France signed a pact with Italy, Yugoslavia drew away from France and was even inclined to listen to German approaches. No wonder that the subtleties of the Danubian puzzle tend to baffle the stranger. Anyway, the revival of Hungarian revisionism may give a new lease of life to the Little Entente. As long as Italy and Germany were quarrelling about Austria these two powers were contending with one another and with France for influence on the Danube. If Germany and Italy succeed in agreeing on separate zones of influence in this region, France's position must, accordingly, weaken.

### The Small States

Denmark, Holland, Belgium and Switzerland act as a belt of buffer states between the Third Reich and the rest of Northern, Western, and Southern Europe. Austria and Czechoslovakia are on her direct line of attack in the South East; so is Lithuania, in the North East. The position of the buffer states is far from reassuring. Their delicate situation makes them almost passionate adherents of the idea of collective security and the League. But so perilous is their position that they simply cannot afford to take undue risks. The fate of China and Abyssinia may have served them as a warning not to put too much trust in a League of which the aggressor himself was a member. Denmark refused to vote in Geneva for a strongly worded stricture on Germany's treaty breaking. Switzerland did not join in sanctions against Italy and was glad to accept gratuitous German assurances of her territorial integrity. Belgium had recently to be released from her Locarno commitments, implying, as they did, the duty of mutual assistance between herself, Great Britain and France, in case of unprovoked German attack. There is a natural tendency

amongst them to form groups such as the mainly economic Oslo group, including Belgium, Holland and Denmark as well as Norway, Sweden and Finland. A parallel trend is noticeable in the Baltic where Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania formed a neutrality group in September, 1934, as well as in the Balkans, which, since February, 1934, was covered by a pact comprising Yugoslavia, Rumania, Greece and Turkey. Bulgaria is now also falling into line. The armaments race does not stop short of the small states; they, too, are in the run for the prizes of death.

### **Germany's Method of Procedure**

A bolt from the blue. Germany moves troops, denounces a treaty or makes a bid for power in some neighbouring country. Simultaneously an "offensive of peace" is launched. Sensational guarantees are spontaneously offered. Solemn assurances are broadcast: This was Germany's last resort to unilateral action; there will be no more surprises; no quarrel between her and some other country, France, for instance, is conceivable in the future; Germany is prepared to accept a general security pact; to pledge herself to respect the territorial integrity of Belgium and of Holland, if that country should wish her to do so; to safeguard Switzerland; to return to the League.

The partners to the treaties, the countries endangered by the move, the governments committed to maintain solemn covenants fail to act on the spur of the moment. Their counsels are divided. Some of them tend to be convinced of the sincerity of the assurances; others are induced to compromise on their principles for the sake of the selfish advantages; still others fear isolation, if they stick to their guns. The psychological moment for action is allowed to pass.

Negotiations follow. Assurances are sought that Germany means what she says. But questions either draw evasive answers or remain unanswered. Efforts at clarification are branded as an insult or glossed over with

vague generalities. After a time negotiations lapse. An uneasy silence ensues. An appearance of peace returns to the world from which it is rudely awakened by another thunderbolt, more disastrous even than the first. Whereupon the same procedure starts over again.

### **The German Arguments**

The main German arguments are:

Germany has been driven by the Treaty of Versailles to these extremes. She is actually only taking what is her own. The responsibility for her onesided action is with the victorious countries, who failed to revise the Treaty in time.

Insofar as unilateral disarmament or even the demilitarisation of the Rhineland is concerned this argument holds a strong element of truth. Failing general disarmament, these restrictions had to go and if Germany had to break the Treaty to make them go, the responsibility is only partly hers.

And yet the argument is misleading. What Germany's neighbours, including France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and, very probably, even Poland want to be reassured about is not Germany's revision claims, but their own safety. We have discussed the territorial issues in part I. In the West they are almost without interest to Germany; in the East she has herself denied their topical actuality. The Polish Treaty stands unimpaired. Holland, Switzerland, and Austria have not annexed an acre of Germany's territory. Czechoslovakia has received a few acres but even in Germany this is hardly ever mentioned. The argument of revision cannot be adduced to justify Germany's methods of force, since the aim of her actions is obviously not revision but something entirely different.

Germany herself defines these aims with sufficient clarity:

Germany needs land for colonial settlement in the East of Europe. She cannot and will not accept the territorial

status insofar as the U.S.S.R. is concerned. Also she does not relinquish her natural and racial claim of uniting all German settlements of Middle Europe in one realm.

The realisation of this twofold aim would mean the destruction of a series of states between the Baltic in the North and Italy in the South, between the Channel in the West, and the Black Sea in the South East. It is highly improbable that such a transformation could leave Asia untouched. The intervention of Japan in a war against Russia is almost a matter of course. Thus the change would affect practically all states between the Atlantic and the Pacific. Such a process, whatever its rights or wrongs, has certainly nothing in common with the revision of Versailles. What the nations of Europe fear, is not a rectification of the German frontiers. It is the engulfment of Europe in a German Reich.

But Germany, runs another argument, is prepared to offer safeguards that she will not pursue the unification of all Germans by any other but peaceful means.

On the surface this may seem surprising. By what other means than by war can frontiers be abolished and the nations, separated by these frontiers, be united? But to those who have followed Germany's methods in Austria, in Danzig, in Memel, in Belgium, in Denmark, in Switzerland, indeed even in farther-off places such as Hungary, Rumania, there is no reason to be astonished. The rising of the Austrian Nazi had the moral, material and political backing of the Reich. In Danzig, the League commissioner as well as the political opponents of the Nazi were brushed aside with the open approval of Berlin. In Czechoslovakia the Henlein Party of the Sudetendeutschen is playing the rôle of the Nazi Party in Austria. These are only a few instances of the "peaceful penetration" that proceeds through the fomenting of *national* unrest in the countries affected. In other cases *social* conflict plays a similar rôle. Not the non-German racial opponent but Marxism is the enemy. The Rexist Party of Degrelle in Belgium; the Nazi plot against Prime Minister Darányi in Hungary; the Iron Guard activities



against Titulescu and, later, King Carol of Rumania himself; the insurrection of Franco in Spain, and various other reactionary movements had the open or secret support of the Third Reich. Non-aggression agreements would never be able to protect a country against methods of this kind.

To the uninitiated it may seem that a bilateral non-aggression treaty must necessarily increase general security even though perhaps at first only between the two parties concerned. So after all a bilateral treaty is better than no treaty. This however is a fallacy. Unless the obligations of the Covenant of the League are expressly excepted from the bilateral treaty, the effect of such a treaty is to release the signatories of the treaty from their obligations under the Covenant. Germany not being a member of the League, this will refer, as a rule to the country with which Germany concludes the treaty. That country practically binds itself not to assist any country Germany happens to be at war with *whether Germany was the aggressor or not*. Bilateral non-aggression agreements therefore take away from collective security, unless a clause to the opposite is stipulated in the treaty. Such a stipulation is meant by the phrase "in the framework of the League." Incidentally, this marks the difference between the Locarno engagements of England and France, or the engagements under the Franco-Russian treaty, and the German treaties. The former cannot release either of the signatories from the obligation of taking part in military sanctions against the other signatory, if the other signatory has committed an act of aggression against a third party. Bilateral treaties outside the framework of the League (or some other system of collective security) are an act of legal preparation of aggression with a view to preventing the other party from coming to the aid of the victim.

A stronger case can be made out for the return of Germany's colonies. Her people never believed in the sincerity of the arguments adduced by the victorious powers to justify them in depriving her of her oversea

possessions. She was not the only country the record of which had been soiled by instances of colonial maladministration, or, at least, of patently selfish administration carried on in the sole interest of the Mother country. Nor did the charge of incapacity levelled against Imperial Germany as a colonising power carry much conviction in view of the obvious partiality of the jury from which the indictment came. On the other hand, the economic value of her colonies to Germany herself had been comparatively small. Apart from the concession of Kiautchau, her oversea territories consisted of Tanganyika, the Cameroons, Togoland, South West Africa as well as some islands in the Pacific. Their German population hardly reached 20,000; their exports to Germany covered no more than some £2,000,000 of a total of German raw material imports of about £270,000,000. No wonder that of all territorial revision claims the demand for the return of her colonies was least eagerly pressed by Germany's statesmen. Hitler himself held strongly the view that colonies had been a wasting asset in the national household of pre-war Germany; his whole policy tended towards the acquisition of land for settlement in the vicinity of Germany's Eastern frontiers. There is no reason to assume that Hitler since his assumption of power has changed his views on this point. The colonial claims that Germany has been more recently putting forward with some insistence appear to be rather in the nature of a bargaining counter than of a genuine objective. She may be pressing them primarily in order to persuade Great Britain not to oppose her (Germany's) expansionist aims in other directions. Germany, in effect, proposes to barter her colonial demands for a free hand against the U.S.S.R. Undoubtedly, her former colonies possess almost none of the raw materials her industries may be in need of. Of a list of some 35 main industrial raw materials, her colonies contain only three, sisal, some phosphate, and vanadium. Even if she succeeded in regaining all her former colonies, the list of the raw materials for which she would still remain

largely, if not entirely, dependent upon the world market would include iron-ore, copper, lead, zinc, manganese, nickel, oil, rubber, cotton, wool and other basic materials. The return of her colonies would leave Germany's economic position practically unaffected.

But does not the very length of this list suggest that Germany (together with Italy and Japan) belongs to that group of Have-not states whose alleged economic conflict with the Haves is at the root of the present world tension? The argument cannot be lightly dismissed, though it will hardly bear close scrutiny. In the last century colonies were undoubtedly a valuable asset to their respective Mother countries. In the first quarter of the present century this advantage tended to fade away; countries without colonial possessions such as Denmark, the Scandinavian states or Switzerland ranked amongst the well to do; Germany possessed no substantial colonies and yet she was wealthy and powerful. Since the collapse of the international gold standard however the position is slightly altered. The importance of the use of national currency is on the increase. It may, to-day, appear advantageous to a state to be able to buy raw materials in exchange for its own currency. Again the value of colonies is somewhat enhanced in view of the strategic importance of raw material supplies in case of a conflict with the League of Nations. A country against which economic sanctions are being enforced by the League may still be able to wage a war in spite of the League boycott, if that country has access to raw materials in territories under her own flag. The strategic argument works, however, also the other way. In spite of the none too great economic advantages attached to the possession of colonies, the colony-owning countries may be loth to part with their possessions if they have reasons to fear that their former territories would be used to strategical ends, as naval or aerial bases. For the former owners might then well be forced to take expensive counter-measures such as a substantial increase of their naval armaments. Unfortunately, the

possibility of a military use of colonies, including their use as a recruiting-ground for black armies, cannot be ruled out under present conditions. This is an added reason why no other but a constructive international solution of the colonial problem in the framework of a general peace settlement appears to meet the demands of the situation.

Much has been made of Germany's willingness to agree to naval limitations; to join in the convention of the limitation of submarine warfare; to sign an agreement with Austria. But limitations of naval building programmes are often no more than a matter of financial convenience; the submarine convention involves no measure of international control of armaments; and the Austrian agreement of July 11th, 1936, does not appear to have been that unequivocal safeguard of a peaceful settlement of all German-Austrian quarrels that it was purported to be at the time of its conclusion. The fact remains that Germany consistently refuses to sign an agreement of mutual assistance such as would safeguard all European countries against an unprovoked attack on her part. Two of her neighbours, Lithuania and Czechoslovakia are frequently omitted from her peace-proposals altogether. Yet the dismemberment of Lithuania by Germany and Poland, that of Czechoslovakia by Germany and Hungary, would inevitably precipitate a conflict with Hungary's other neighbours as well as the Baltic states and the U.S.S.R.—the beginning of a new world war.

### **The Conquest of Abyssinia**

By the end of 1934 France was becoming more and more disturbed on account of Germany's new attitude. She was looking to the U.S.S.R. and to Italy as possible allies. But while the adherence of the U.S.S.R. to the League tended to strengthen the system of collective security in Europe, the Franco-Italian understanding resulted in a serious blow to that system. Indeed, Laval's pact with Mussolini of January 7th, 1935, eventually proved one of the most disastrous blunders of French post-war policy.

By weakening the League it played straight into the hands of Germany.

Mussolini, who was troubled about the threatening Nazi conquest of Austria, assured Laval that Italy did not think of attacking France, thus allowing that country to withdraw her troops from the Italian frontier. Laval, in exchange, intimated that France had no economic interests in Abyssinia—a hint that Mussolini did not fail to turn to the fullest account. In the course of the barbarous Italian war of aggression on Abyssinia, Laval, tied by his promises, permitted the most serious attempt ever made at asserting the international authority of the League, to fail ignominiously. The damage done to the prestige of the League was lasting, while France's imaginary advantage melted away almost at once when Mussolini directed his sympathies back to Germany again.

The practically unanimous decision of the League of Nations Assembly of October 9th, 1935, to apply financial and economic sanctions to Italy so as to prevent her from continuing her war of aggression on Abyssinia, came as a great surprise to the world. The League of Nations could act, once it was given a lead! That Great Britain, not France, was the country that had actually given the lead was another surprise. In fact the unexpected change of rôle of these two countries towards the League made many French people doubt the sincerity of Britain's intentions. Still, had Laval not injudiciously wished to spare Mussolini (a desire strongly shared by none too few British die-hards) and had Great Britain felt freer to co-operate with Russia in the League, for the purposes of the League, the outcome might have been very different. In the event, the French and British governments did their best to fix the blame on the U.S.A. for the failure of the League to impose oil-sanctions. The excuse could not hold, since Roosevelt and Hull had, in effect, succeeded in keeping American oil exports down to the normal level. True, Congress refused to vote a neutrality law that would have authorised

Roosevelt and Hull to continue on these lines. This, however, happened after the publication of the unfortunate Hoare-Laval peace proposals of December, 1935, which appeared to be a striking confirmation of the charge of insincerity levelled against the Baldwin government by many who were reluctant to believe that the Tories had overnight become wholehearted supporters of the League. The proposals themselves were speedily withdrawn, but the injury to the prestige of the League could not be repaired, for a British government that had agreed to such terms was hardly in the position to press for the extension of economic sanctions. Thus, Abyssinia, a member of the League, was gassed out of existence by Italy and sanctions had to be lifted. Curiously enough, this outcome was asserted to have proven the failure not of the British Government, but of the League system. Italy had scored against the League by the lack of decision and clarity of purpose of the democratic great powers.

### Spanish Democracy and Her Foes

On the 16th of July the withdrawal of the League sanctions imposed upon Italy came into effect. Almost on the same day several Italian army pilots were secretly listed to engage in an adventure in the course of which Italy and Germany were to show to the world a sample of the new politics of *social interventionism*.

On 18th July a military rising broke out in Spanish Morocco which swiftly spread to Spain. Several squadrons of Italian aeroplanes which had been held in readiness flew to the aid of the rebels, and eventually forced the loyalist fleet to retire. Foreign legionaries and Moorish troops were transhipped from Africa to the mainland. These were the beginnings of a civil war the outcome of which was still in the balance a year later.

Franco-Italian friendship which had prevented France from following Britain's lead in Geneva had come to an abrupt end in May, 1936, when the French electorate brought a Left government to power. The Popular Front

cabinet was headed by a Socialist Prime Minister and was supported by the Communist Party. Mussolini turned away from France.

The Spanish rebels represented an alliance of big landowners, the military and the Church, common in backward Catholic Countries. They denounced the democratic and republican government as "Bolshevik."

This gave Italy the cue. Her true aims were starkly imperialistic—she was out for political and territorial gain in the Western Mediterranean. She camouflaged them by pretending merely to engage on a crusade against the "Reds." The effect was instantaneous. Almost overnight a military rebellion against constituted government was, in the eyes of the world, transformed into a Fascist-Communist civil war. Active German and Italian intervention on the side of the rebels followed, as a matter of course. Eventually, the democratic great powers were successfully pressed to depart from the accepted rules of international law and to issue an arms embargo against the Spanish government. Franco, who was at first in a hopeless military position, became a most formidable opponent. But for the dramatic intervention of the International Brigade Madrid would have been lost on the 7th of November.

This feat of solidarity on the part of the international working class was the result of Democratic, Socialist and Communist counter-intervention. Italian and German émigrés, liberal anti-Fascists, Austrian Schutzbündlers, Socialists and Communists of all countries had saved Madrid. The French and the Russian governments were favourable to counter-intervention: the French both on national and social grounds, the Russian on account of the danger of an increased Fascist strength in Europe, in case Franco won. Russian help to the Spanish government, though consisting in the provision of instructors and aeroplane models mainly, was used as welcome pretence by the Fascist powers to send regular army formations, eventually called "volunteers", to Franco's aid.

By her excursion to Spain Germany was trying to out-flank France; Italy was making a bid to capture naval bases from where she could threaten Great Britain's sea routes in the Mediterranean. Thus both countries were originally urged on merely by nationalist motives. Eventually, however, Fascist solidarity grew into a real force. Germany and Italy formed an anti-Red block with the self-set mission of saving the world from Bolshevism. Incidentally, their acts of self-abnegation happened regularly to coincide with their national and imperialistic interests. The Berlin-Rome axis, the existence of which was announced in January, 1937, was the visible outcome of the new line. The so-called Non-Intervention Committee in London which British and French diplomacy had tried to use as a brake on Fascist intervention in Spain, was unable to cope with the forces of international anarchy, once these had been allowed to browbeat the League. What had been relinquished in Geneva, could not be regained in London.

Europe to-day is torn by national and social conflict. A system of collective security, set up by the democratic and socialist countries in the framework of the League, remains the only hope.



## APPENDIX I

### WHEN DID IT HAPPEN?

#### FIRST POST-WAR PERIOD (1919-1933)

##### *The Great War*

1914-1918 Armistice on 11th November 1918.

##### *Peace Treaties*

1919-1920 Treaty of Versailles (Germany).  
Treaty of St. Germain (Austria).  
Treaty of Trianon (Hungary).  
Treaty of Neuilly (Bulgaria).  
Treaty of Sèvres (Turkey); revised in  
Lausanne in 1923.

##### *Swing towards democracy, republic and socialism; far-reaching land-reform in Eastern Europe*

1917	Russia	Kerenski revolution in March; Bolshevik revolution in November.
1917	Finland	republic.
1918	Estonia	republic.
1918	Lithuania	republic.
1918	Latvia	republic.
1918	Poland	republic.
1918	Hungary	democratic revolution in October; Bolshevik revolution in March 1919.
1918	Austria	republic; socialist influence.
1918	Germany	republic; social democratic President.
1918	Czechoslovakia	republic.
1918	Rumania	agrarian reform.
1918	Jugoslavia	agrarian reform in new territory.
1919	Italy	socialist and Catholic left-wing influence; occupation of factories.

##### *Counter-revolutions*

1918	Finland	White terror.
1918	Estonia	
1918	Latvia	
1919	Hungary	White terror.

- 1920 Austria Christian Socialist government except in Vienna; 1929 constitution revised; 1934 Vienna tenements shelled.
- 1922 Italy Fascist march on Rome; Matteotti murdered in June 1924.
- 1923 Bulgaria Macedonian *putsch*; Stambuliiski murdered.
- 1926 Poland Pilsudski's *coup d'état*.
- 1928 Yugoslavia Radic shot; *coup d'état* in January 1929.
- 1932 Germany Papen's *coup d'état* in Prussia on the 20th July; Hitler comes to power in 1933.

### *Peace Treaties violated*

- 1920 Italy occupies Fiume.
- 1920 Poland occupies Vilna.
- 1923 Italy seizes Corfu.
- 1923 Lithuania occupies Memel.

### *Collective security*

- 1923 Draft Treaty of mutual guarantee passed by L. of N. Assembly; adherence refused by Macdonald Government in 1924.
- 1924 Geneva Protocol Macdonald-Herriot; rejected by Conservative Government on 12th March 1925.
- 1928 Kellogg Pact, 27th August.

### *Disarmament*

- 1927 Preparatory Commission for Disarmament Conference meets.
- 1932 Disarmament Conference meets.
- 1933 Germany leaves Conference on 14th October.
- 1934 French Prime Minister Barthou rejects arms compromise in March.
- 1935 " . . . the Disarmament Conference goes into a twilight sleep but gives birth to no solution."

### *League prevents war*

- 1925 Greco-Bulgarian conflict stopped.
- 1934 Yugoslav charges against Hungary on account of assassination of King Alexander; Hungarian counter-charges of persecution of Magyar minorities in Yugoslavia.

*Franco-German relations*

- 1920 Versailles Treaty ratified by Germany.
- 1923 Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr.
- 1926 Evacuation of 1st Rhineland zone (Locarno).
- 1926 Germany joins the League.
- 1930 Evacuation of 2nd and 3rd Rhineland zone (Young Plan).

*Treaties and regional pacts*

Little Entente.

- 1921 Rumania joins Czechoslovak-Yugoslav military convention against restoration of Hapsburgs in Hungary; Alliance 1923.

France.

- 1920 Treaties concluded with Belgium;
- 1921 with Poland;
- 1924 with Czechoslovakia;
- 1926 with Rumania;
- 1927 with Yugoslavia.

Germany.

- 1922 Treaty of friendship with Russia, signed in Rapallo;
- 1926 renewed;
- 1931 renewed.

Italy.

- 1920 Rapallo Treaty with Yugoslavia.
- 1924 Treaty of friendship and collaboration with Yugoslavia; not renewed in 1929.
- 1926 Treaty with Albania.
- 1927 Defence alliance with Albania.

England.

- 1925 LOCARNO PACT. Great Britain and Italy guarantee France and Belgium against German aggression and *vice versa*, on 16th October.

## ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL

*Currencies depreciate*

- 1917 Russia.
- 1918-20 Baltic States.
- Austria.
- Hungary.
- 1921 Germany.
- Greece.
- Bulgaria.

*Currencies stabilised with League help*

- 1922 Austria.
- 1923 Hungary.
- 1926 Estonia.
- 1927 Greece.
- 1928 Bulgaria.

*Currencies stabilised by own effort*

- 1924 Russia; currency established on gold basis.
- 1924 Germany; currency established on gold basis.
- 1925 Great Britain; pound restored to parity.
- 1926 Belgium; franc devalued by 6/7th.
- 1926 France; franc devalued by 4/5th.
- 1926 Italy; lira devalued by approximately 3/4th.

*Gold Standard dropped*

- 1931 Great Britain and pound-block countries go off gold.

*Reparations*

- 1921 London Conference fixes total amount at 6,600 millions gold pound sterling.
- 1924 Dawes Plan fixes annuities (maximum) at 125 million pounds; transfer regulated; total amount left open.
- 1929 Young Plan fixes total and spreads payments over 59 years; annuities somewhat lower than in Dawes Plan.
- 1931 Hoover moratorium suspends all War debt and Reparations payments for a year.
- 1932 Lausanne Conference practically abolishes reparations.

*Economic reconstruction*

- 1927 Geneva convention on removal of hindrances to trade signed.
- 1929 Geneva customs truce protocol.
- 1930 Oslo convention; Belgium, Holland and Denmark agree on a gradual lowering of tariffs.
- 1931 Great Britain introduces protective tariffs.
- 1932 Ottawa agreement on mutual Empire preferences.
- 1933 World Economic and Monetary Conference in London fails.

## SECOND POST-WAR PERIOD (1933—)

## ENGLAND.

*Home Affairs:*

1935	28th June	Peace Ballot results announced.
	14th Nov.	General Elections.
	18th Dec.	Sir Samuel Hoare resigns.
1936	2nd Oct.	Scope of British rearmament announced.

*Four Power Pact:*

1933	18th March	Mussolini proposes a Pact between Italy, Germany, Great Britain and France. These Powers should practically take the place of the League in Europe.
	15th July	Pact signed in very substantially modified form.

*Germany and France:*

1933	14th Oct.	Germany leaves the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations.
1934	Jan.	British efforts to bring back Germany into the League.
	March	Barthou rejects arms compromise.
	8-10th July	Barthou in London.
	12th July	Great Britain suggests in Berlin regional pacts of mutual guarantee.
	10th Sept.	Germany virtually rejects Eastern Pact.
1935	3rd Feb.	Anglo-French declaration offering Germany equality of armaments in exchange for security agreement.
	4th March	British White Paper on rearmament.
	5th March	Hitler "has a cold"; cannot meet British statesmen in Berlin.
	16th March	Germany announces reintroduction of conscription.
	25-26th March	In spite of German rearmament surprise, Sir John Simon and Eden decide to visit Berlin.
	28-31st March	Eden visits Moscow.

- 1935 11-14th April English-French-Italian conference at Stresa.
- 12th April Germany declares that she is still prepared to enter Eastern Pact of non-aggression even though other powers signed mutual assistance agreements.
- 2nd May Sir John Simon declares that Franco-Russian Treaty signed that day leaves Britain's commitments under Locarno Pact unaffected.
- 5th Aug. Britain reminds Germany of her undertaking to negotiate Eastern Pact. Germany replies that she "wishes to leave this to quieter times."
- 1936 7th March Germany reoccupies the demilitarised Rhineland zone. She denounces the Treaty of Locarno. England refuses to consider military action on this account.
- 8-20th March League of Nations Council and Locarno powers meeting in London. Britain gives military assurances to France and Belgium in case of German aggression.
- 31st March German proposals for the establishment of permanent peace; Austria, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania and Russia left out.
- 6th May British questionnaire concerning these proposals (remained unanswered).
- 18th Sept. Eden proposes that a Five-Power Conference (Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium) should be called soon.
- 21st Dec. *Times* article offering to Germany economic in exchange for political concessions.
- 1937 19th Jan. Eden, referring to German peace-plan: "Not words but deeds needed."



- 1937 30th Jan. Hitler raises colonial issue. German self-sufficiency plans to be proceeded with in any case.
- 11th Feb. 400 million pounds defence loan announced.
- 24th April Anglo-French declaration, releasing Belgium from her Locarno commitments.
- 15th June Neurath invited by British Government to visit London.
- 21st June Following on the *Deutschland* incident Neurath postpones his visit indefinitely.
- 22nd June London discussions about *Leipzig* incident break down. England and France refuse to take part in punitive measures against Valencia without previous investigation into German complaint.

*Italy* (see also Abyssinia):

- 1935 29th Aug. British fleet concentrated in Alexandria.
- 1937 2nd Jan. Mediterranean "gentlemen's agreement" signed.
- 31st July Chamberlain-Mussolini exchange of letters.

**GERMANY.**

*Home Affairs:*

- 1933 30th Jan. Hitler nominated Chancellor.
- 27th Feb. Reichstag fire. Communist Party banned.
- 5th March General Elections.
- 24th March Four years' mandate. Cabinet empowered to make law by ordinance.
- 1st April Boycott of Jews.
- 1st May Nazi Labour Day.
- 1934 30th June Purge. Numerous Nazi leaders put to death.
- 2nd Aug. Hindenburg's death. Hitler "Führer and Chancellor of the Reich."
- 1935 15th Sept. Nuremburg laws: Swastika made Reich emblem; Jews deprived of full citizenship; racial marriage laws.



1936 9th Sept. New Four Years Plan for the substitution of imported raw materials proclaimed.

*Austria:*

1933 7th March Invasion of Austria threatened. Austro-German conflict.

1934 25th July Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss murdered by Nazis.

1936 11th July Agreement with Austria.

*Italy:*

1933 March Germany supports Four Power Plan.

11th Sept. Dollfuss declares for an authoritarian Austrian State under Italian auspices.

1934 14th June Hitler and Mussolini meet in Stra.

25th July Nazi rising in Austria; Italy moves troops to Austrian frontier.

1936 8th March Italy refuses to join in Locarno powers' action to restrain Germany.

11th July Agreement on Austria reached.

1937 17th Jan. Berlin-Rome axis proclaimed. Co-operation in Spain. Joint action in Non-intervention Committee.

*Poland:*

1933 3rd May Agreement between Germany and Poland "within the framework of the Treaties" officially foreshadowed.

1934 26th Jan. 'Ten years' agreement with Poland signed.

*U.S.S.R. (see also France):*

1936 27th Nov. Ribbentrop signs anti-Communist agreement with Japan in Berlin.

*South-Eastern Europe:*

1936 10-19th June Dr. Schacht visits Vienna, Belgrade, Athens, Sofia and Budapest.

**FRANCE.**

*Home Affairs:*

1934 6th Feb. Stavisky riots; fascist menace. Daladier resigns.

1934	9th Feb.	Doumergue Cabinet. Foreign affairs: Barthou, later Laval.
	9th Nov.	Flandin Government. Foreign affairs: Laval.
1935	7th June	Prime Minister and foreign affairs: Laval.
1936	24th Jan.	Sarraut Government. Foreign affairs: Flandin.
	26th April	Popular Front victory at general elections.
	27th May	Stay-in strikes start.
	4th June	Blum Government. Foreign affairs: Delbos.
1937	21st June	Blum Government resigns. Chautemps Government. Foreign affairs: Delbos.

*Eastern Pact:*

1934	April	Barthou visits Warsaw, Prague, Bucharest and Belgrade.
	18th May	Barthou's conversation with Litvinov in Geneva.
	8-10th July	Proposal of Eastern Pact; to include France, Germany, the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Baltic States.
	5-6th Dec.	Laval and Litvinov agree to consult on Eastern Pact.
	11th Dec.	Czechoslovakia makes similar arrangements with U.S.S.R.
1935	9th April	France and the U.S.S.R. state to have agreed on principle to conclude a mutual assistance convention.
	2nd May	Franco-Russian mutual assistance pact signed in Paris. The agreement is subject to the provisions of the Covenant of the League and the Locarno Pact.
	10-12th May	Laval in Warsaw and Moscow.
	15th May	Stalin declares that French Communist Party will support French rearmament.
1936	27th March	Franco-Russian Pact ratified.

## ITALY.

- 1934 16th March Austria, Hungary and Italy sign the Rome Protocols
- 1935 7th Jan. Laval-Mussolini agreement.
- 1936 23rd March Additional instruments to the Rome Protocols.
- 1937 26th March Jugoslav-Italian Treaty signed in Belgrade.

(See also other Western European countries and Abyssinia).

## U.S.S.R.

*Home Affairs:*

- 1935 6th Feb. New Constitution announced. Secret ballot and equal voting-power of town and countryside to be introduced; one-party leadership to be maintained.
- 25th July-31st Aug. VII Comintern Congress. Dimitrov announces reversal of Comintern policy. Popular fronts against Fascism to be formed everywhere.
- 1936 23rd Aug. Zinoviev - Kamenev trial. The accused are shot.
- 1937 30th Jan. Pjatakov-Radek trial. Except for Radek, Sokolnikov and two others, the accused are shot.
- 11th June Eight high military commanders shot on the charge of treason.

*Joining the League:*

- 1934 27th Jan. Stalin's speech on the dangers of the foreign situation.
- 17th Feb. Non-aggression treaties with seven of Russia's neighbours ratified.
- 28th March Litvinov invites Germany to sign protocol guaranteeing the independence of Baltic States.
- 14th April Germany rejects this proposal.
- 18th July Russia informs Great Britain that she is inclined to offer Germany also a guarantee of security.
- 12th Sept. Poland refuses to take part in the Pact.

- 1934 14th Sept. Little Entente decides to support the Pact.  
 18th Sept. Russia joins the League with a permanent seat on the Council.

**FAR EAST.**

- 1931 18th Sept. Japan invades Manchuria.  
 1932 28th Jan. Japan attacks Chapei.  
 1933 27th March Japan leaves the League.  
 1934 23rd April Japanese Monroe doctrine declared.  
 1935 8th Dec. East Hopei and Chahar autonomous council.  
 1937 7th July Punitive expedition in North China launched.

**ABYSSINIA.**

- 1934 5th Dec. Wal-Wal incident.  
 1935 17th March Abyssinia appeals to the League.  
 29th Aug. British fleet leaves Malta.  
 11th Sept. Sir Samuel Hoare declares that Great Britain would stand "for steady and collective resistance against all acts of unprovoked aggression."  
 3rd Oct. Italian troops move into Abyssinia.  
 9th Oct. League Assembly declares Italy the aggressor. Economic sanctions to be applied against Italy.  
 9-18th Dec. Hoare-Laval peace terms announced. Sir Samuel Hoare resigns.  
 1936 9th May Italy proclaims the annexation of Abyssinia.  
 16th July The removal of sanctions imposed on Italy become effective.

**SPAIN.**

- 1923 13th Sept. Primo de Rivera assumes dictatorship.  
 1931 14th April King Alfonso yields the throne.  
 28th June Constitutional Assembly elected: Left: 291, Centre: 136, Right: 42.  
 1933 19th Nov. Cortez elected: Left: 98, Centre: 162, Right: 212.

1934	5th Oct.	Rising of miners in Asturias.
1936	16th Feb.	Cortez elected: Left: 265, Centre: 64, Right: 144.
	18th July	Reactionary rising in Spanish Morocco.
	26-28th July	French embargo on arms to Spain.
	30th July	Italian aeroplanes bound for Franco make forced landing in French Morocco.
	2nd Aug.	French non-intervention proposal.
	19th Aug.	British arms embargo.
	9th Sept.	Non-Intervention Committee meets in London. Portugal not represented.
	23rd Oct.	U.S.S.R. declares not to be bound to greater extent than Germany and Italy.
	7th Nov.	International Brigade saves Madrid.
	18th Nov.	Spanish Government appeals to League against German and Italian intervention.
	27th Nov.	Germany and Italy recognise the Franco Government, in identical terms.
	12th Dec.	German and Italian Governments wish to postpone control of arms embargo until issue of "indirect" intervention is settled.
	21st Dec.	French Government warns Germany that non-intervention cannot be one-sided.
1937	9th Jan.	Delbos expresses in Berlin concern about German military preparations in Spanish Morocco.
	11th Jan.	Hitler gives reassuring answer to French Ambassador.
	20th Feb.	Ban on volunteers in force; Control scheme accepted; supervision fixed for 6th March—Germany, Italy and Portugal have date postponed to 13th March and, subsequently, to 20th April. During the whole

1937	period French and British embargo in full force.
13th March	Four fully equipped Italian divisions take part in the attack on Madrid.
20th March	An Italian division defeated at the Guadalajara front.
20th April	Naval supervision scheme formally in force.
26th April	Guernica destroyed by German bombers.
29th May	<i>Deutschland</i> incident.
31st May	Almeria reprisals.
12th June	Four control powers reach agreement on continuation of Naval Supervision.
15th June	Alleged <i>Leipzig</i> incident.
22nd June	Germany demands immediate reprisals. No agreement can be reached on this demand.
23rd June	Germany and Italy withdraw.
25th June	Chamberlain: "We may yet be able to save the peace of Europe."
9th July	Britain asked to suggest a compromise in Non-intervention Committee.
16th July	British proposals unanimously accepted as basis of discussion.
1st Aug.	No agreement in sight.

## APPENDIX II

### SOME BOOKS TO READ

- Raymond L. Buell: *A History of Ten Years*. 2 vols., rev. ed. 1930. A reliable account.
- Stephen King-Hall: *Our Own Times*, 1913-1934. 2 vols., London, 1934-1935. A brilliant and instructive book.
- G. H. Gathorne-Hardy: *Short Survey of International Affairs* 1920-1934. Oxford University Press, 1934. An expert's analysis.
- G. D. H. & M. Cole: *Intelligent Man's Review of Europe To-day*. Gollancz, 1933.
- G. D. H. and M. Cole: *A Guide to Modern Politics*. Gollancz, 1934. Two standard works.
- J. B. Horrabin: *An Atlas of Current Affairs*. Gollancz, 1935. With instructive comments.
- J. Hampden Jackson: *Europe Since the War*. Gollancz, 1936. From the Communist view-point.
- John Gunther: *Inside Europe*. Hamilton, 1936. Intimate sketches by a keen American observer.
- R. L. Buell: *The Dangerous Year*, 1935. Foreign Policy Pamphlets, March, 1936. The dictatorship issue in foreign policy.
- H. N. Brailsford: *Towards a New League*. *New Statesman* pamphlets, July, 1936. A Socialist criticism of the League in its present form.
- F. H. Simonds: *Can Europe Keep the Peace?* Hamilton, 1931. An American states the case against a revision of the Treaties.

#### *Austria*

- G. E. R. Gedye: *Heirs to the Hapsburgs*. Cheap ed. Arrowsmith, 1933. The background of Austrian counter-revolution.
- Otto Bauer: *Austrian Democracy Under Fire*. 1934. By the Austrian Socialist leader.
- Oscar Jaszi: *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*. Chicago University Press, 1929. A penetrating historical analysis.

#### *Germany*

- F. C. Schuman: *Hitler and Nazi Dictatorship*. Hale, 1936. A careful and stimulating description of the Nazi movement.
- K. Heiden: *A History of National Socialism*. Methuen, 1934. The author is a former German Social Democrat.
- W. Steed: *Whence and Whither? Meaning of National Socialism*. Nisbet, 1934. A criticism of Nazi foreign policy.
- "Friends of Europe" pamphlets. Documentary.

*Hungary*

- Oscar Jaszi: *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary*. London, 1924. In defence of Hungarian democracy.
- C. A. Macartney: *Hungary*. Benn, 1934. A scholarly survey of past and present.
- R. H. Seton-Watson: *Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers*. London, 1934. A criticism of Hungarian revisionism. Figures and facts.

*Italy*

- H. W. Schneider: *Making the Fascist State*. New York, 1928. A study of the rise of Italian Fascismo.
- A. Finer: *Mussolini's Italy*. Gollancz, 1935. A Liberal criticism of Fascist politics.
- G. Salvemini: *Under the Axe of Fascism*. Gollancz, 1936. An indictment of Fascist economics by an Italian Liberal.

*Russia*

- W. H. Chamberlin: *Russia's Iron Age*. Duckworth, London, 1935. The author, an American journalist, is a bitter critic of Soviet Russia.
- Walter Duranty: *I Write as I Please*. Hamilton, 1936. A short survey by another American journalist; sympathetic to Russia.
- S. and B. Webb: *Soviet Communism: A new Civilization?* London, 1935. The political and administrative structure of Soviet Russia; strongly sympathetic to Russian Communism.

*Spain*

- S. Madariaga: *Spain*. Benn, 1930. By a Liberal.
- J. Langdon-Davies: *Behind the Spanish Barricades*. London, 1936. Sympathetic to the Spanish Republic.
- Frank Pitcairn: *Reporter in Spain*. Lawrence, 1936. A communist's account of the early days of the civil war.
- Ramon J. Sender: *Seven Red Sundays*. London, 1936. A fine historical novel; reveals the psychology of Spanish Anarchism.

*Raw Materials and Colonies*

- F. H. Simonds and E. Emery: *Great Powers in World Politics*. 2 vols., 1935. The case of the Have-nots stated.
- Sir Norman Angell: *This Have and Have-not Business: Political Fantasy and Economic Fact*. Hamilton, 1936. Their case demolished.



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